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ABSTRACT
Most empirical models of bond markets developed over the past quarter of 
a century have made use of discount function methodologies. Whilst 
representing a significant technical refinement, the use of discount functions 
is fraught with problems. These may, for convenience, be classified as 
relating either to "functional form" or to "market imperfections".
The choice of functional form usually emphasizes either a specified 
economic model or perceived regularities in empirical data. The formulation 
used in this study, while not too dissimilar from those that emerge from 
certain arbitrage models of the term structure, is designed with a view to 
being better behaved and easier to compute than others currently in use. Its 
wide-ranging applicability is illustrated by fitting the same model to two 
relatively simple cases - the German Bund and Dutch government bullet 
markets - and then extending it to the case of the UK gilt market.
Market imperfections cannot always be accommodated within a discount 
function model. This study focuses on two types of imperfections: 
segmentation or "clientele" effects, and taxation. Both these imperfections 
appear to be present in the gilt market, and the discount function 
methodology is adjusted so as to model this market by means of three 
representative investors endowed with different tax regimes and net of tax 
discount functions. The effective rates of tax and implied market 
segmentation resulting from the estimation appear to conform well to other 
empirical and anecdotal evidence. The main theoretical shortcoming of such 
an approach is the "buy-and-hold" assumption used to calculate tax 
payments. However, a partial test of the significance of this weakness 
concludes that it may be empirically unimportant in the case of gilts.
Finally, the framework thus developed is utilized to discuss various aspects 
of supply and demand influences on the gilt price structure.
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I. DISCOUNT FUNCTIONS AND YIELD SURFACES
1.1 Introduction
The use of discount functions in empirical models of bond markets, 
which is nowadays widespread practice, is a relatively recent 
development, with the main body of existing research in this field 
dating back no more than 20 years. The principal reason for the 
emergence of this methodology is the fact that the term structure of 
interest rates or yields is not in general directly observable. The 
relevant data cover prices1 of individual assets (deposits, bills, bonds, 
etc.) which may - or, indeed, may not - reflect the existence of a term 
structure, and usually incorporate complex unobservable attributes 
such as credit risk.
Since the term structure is unobservable it can at most be estimated. 
Therefore, the numerous tests and applications of economic theory 
involving results of such an estimation are dependent upon the 
approach followed. This is important because different assumptions 
can produce very different results, as is apparent from the discussion 
of the UK gilt market in chapter ID.
The first two chapters of this study focus on the use of discount function 
methodologies for modelling bond markets when there are no tax 
effects. After a brief survey of the relevant literature, contained in the 
next section, a number of theoretical results are presented and 
discussed. The theory is followed up in chapter II by empirical 
evidence based on case studies of the German Bund and the Dutch 
government bullet markets. These bond markets are well-suited to the
1. Or, equivalently, nominal rates of interest, yields, etc.
purpose. Although the former was subject briefly to withholding tax 
after 1 January 1989, it was dominated during the period covered in 
the model estimation by investors who were in the main concerned 
about gross returns.1 The Dutch government bullet market was and 
still is an example of a market with virtually no tax effects.
The following five chapters deal with the much more complex case of 
the UK gilt market, which is characterized by significant tax effects 
and segmentation. After describing how the basic discount function 
approach might be extended to cope with this situation, the results of 
empirical work are presented and critically evaluated. In the process, 
a number of tangential topics of significant interest are examined, such 
as the so-called FOTRA effect, or the shocks arising from the 
announcement of new issues.
1. Even after the new tax was announced, the relative pricing of bonds was, for a number 
of reasons, only slightly affected by the tax.
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1.2 Discount function literature
Term structure theory dates back many decades, but serious attempts 
at estimating discount functions before the 1970s were few and far 
between. This is at least in part due to the fact that the more primitive 
versions of term structure theory were ill-suited to cope with the 
subtleties of real fixed interest markets. Most models of the term 
structure have been couched in terms of a pricing rule for tax exempt 
discount bonds, implicitly assuming the existence of a complete set of 
such bonds, and paying little attention to the general relationship 
between term structure and bond prices.
Bond market models incorporate varying degrees of structure, ranging 
from the purely descriptive type to the asset pricing variety based on 
a detailed general equilibrium framework. The former extreme 
consists of nothing more than a contrived mathematical function fitted 
in a price or yield space;1 the results obtained from the application of 
such a method might be inconsistent with any sensible economic 
theory. Conversely, proper economic models, while potentially 
providing a more accurate description, incorporate prior information 
that might heavily bias the results and any subsequent use thereof.2
There are a number of specific factors that are generally believed to 
influence the price of a bond, some of which are the length of the loan, 
the "coupon", the "liquidity" of the issue, the credit worthiness of the 
issuer, and the taxes applicable to the deal. The use of discount 
functions, which would be straightforward in the case of a perfect bond
1. Or in any other one-to-one transform of the price, e.g. its reciprocal (usually called the 
"capital").
2. A trivial example of this would be a model of the UK gilt market which incorporated a 
risk premium positively related to volatility, and concluded that in 1987-88 either market 
participants’ expectations of future interest rates were unreasonable or that a large 
proportion of bonds was heavily mispriced (see the chapters on the gilt market for further 
details).
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market, is fraught with problems in practical situations. The existence 
of taxation is probably the single greatest nuisance, since the tax effects 
depend on circumstances such as the type of bond, the type of holder, 
or the prospective date of disposal, each of which can give rise to 
awkward difficulties. Another problem, which may be enhanced by 
differences in tax status between groups of investors, is market 
segmentation, i.e. the fact that certain bonds may be held exclusively 
by certain categories of investors. These issues are summarily 
discussed in the following subsections.
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1.2.1 No taxation and no segmentation
These are the assumptions made in the more primitive models of 
bond markets. The resulting relationship between term structure 
and bond yields is discussed, inter alios, in Buse [7], Caks [8], 
Carr, Halpem and McCallum [11], Khang [30], Livingston and 
Caks [38], and Schaefer [48]. These studies assume complete 
bond markets1 or an extreme form of expectations hypothesis, 
thus avoiding the fact that in real world situations the very 
existence of a discount function may be brought into question. 
The existence theorem outlined in section 1.3.2 is a simple 
extension of an analogous result described in Schaefer [47].
Early versions of term structure theory were closely linked to a 
form of expectations hypothesis. This appears in the literature 
in a number of guises, the most respectable of which are discussed 
in Cox, Ingersoll and Ross [18].2 At a later stage the emphasis 
moved to modelling the "risk" or "liquidity" premium, 
culminating in a number of sophisticated continuous time 
models, such as those detailed in Brennan and Schwartz [3] or 
in Cox, Ingersoll and Ross [19]. Only in recent years have models 
of the term structure appeared that make allowance for taxation 
and segmentation.
1. A bond market is complete if it is possible to construct, by means of a portfolio of bonds, 
any cash flow contained in a bond belonging to that market.
2. See also Campbell [9] for an alternative view.
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1.2.2 Segmentation
Although informal bond market segmentation theories have been 
around for many years, segmentation has become a major feature 
of the theory thanks mainly to the efforts of Schaefer [e.g. 45, 
46, 47] at the turn of the 70s. This followed close on the heels 
of extensive research into the existence of segmentation or 
"clienteles" in asset markets generally and in equity markets in 
particular. Fixed income markets, however, thanks to the 
near-singularity of their return covariance matrix, were ideal 
candidates for identifying the existence of segmentation. 
Schaefer’s approach is based on assuming that negative holdings 
are not allowed, thus ensuring the existence of an equilibrium in 
the case of investors with different tax rates.1 A discussion of 
how constraints on investors’ positions may be replaced with 
transaction costs and tax asymmetries is contained in Dermody 
and Prisman [23].
Whilst particularly useful in the case of differential taxation, such 
constraints could also be assumed in the general case. This is 
briefly explored in section 1.3.2, but did not appear empirically 
to be applicable to the case studies detailed in chapter II. 
However, segmentation without differential taxation has 
received little attention in the empirical economic literature, and 
is a topic of research that might deserve pursuing further.
1. See section 3.5.3 for more details.
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1.2.3 Taxation
In most bond markets tax considerations are so important that 
they cannot be neglected without leading to absurd results. And 
yet, by and large, term structure theory was developed with scant 
consideration for the existence of taxes. This is probably due to 
the complexity of term structure models with taxation. 
Furthermore, since tax regulations are specific to a bond market 
and to a moment in time, it is impossible to produce a general 
model with taxation.
Although a general model may not be produced, there are 
obviously certain principles that are widely applicable. The 
effects of taxation usually depend on the different tax treatment 
of "principal payments", "income" and "capital gains". A 
discussion of the problems that arise from this diversity of cash 
flows is contained in Litzenberger and Rolfo [31]. Empirical 
work based on a model that assumes one representative investor 
endowed with some kind of "effective tax rates" is contained in 
Cramer and Hawk [21], Jordan [29], Livingston [34, 36, 37], 
McCulloch [41], and Robichek and Niebuhr [43]. Different tax 
brackets within a segmented market are modelled in the 
previously mentioned studies by Schaefer, in Hodges and 
Schaefer [28], and Ronn [44].
A major problem with allowing for taxation is that, even if it is 
assumed that the future tax regulations are known in advance, 
the tax payments attached to a bond usually depend on (maybe 
successive) holders’ trading strategies and on future states of the 
world. For example, as explained in Constantinides [14, 15], 
Constantinides and Ingersoll [16], and Constantinides and 
Scholes [17], the buy-and-hold or buy-and-sell strategies usually 
used to derive net of tax pricing models are sub-optimal if capital
- 15-
gains are taxed or capital losses deducted only when realized. A 
discussion and empirical investigation into these issues in a spirit 
similar to that of Litzenberger and Rolfo [32] is contained in 
chapter V.
The analysis of the gilt market of chapters EH and IV is closest 
in approach to the work of Schaefer, although it differs from this 
in certain respects, such as the joint estimation of discount 
functions for different tax brackets, and the functional form 
chosen. Chapter IV also contains an analysis of how tax rates 
on gilts implied by the model changed in response to expected 
and actual tax changes in the UK 1988 budget. There is little 
empirical literature at present illustrating this kind of effect.
1.2.4 Functional form
Finding functional forms suitable for modelling the term 
structure is particularly difficult. This is reflected in the literature 
by the fact that, with the exception of spline methods, which are 
extensively used in the more recent studies, virtually every author 
adopts a different approach. A thorough discussion of the use of 
splines for term structure estimation is contained in Shea [49, 
50].'
The approach used in this study is somewhat in the spirit of 
Nelson and Siegel [42], in that the functional form, which is not 
a spline, is the solution to a linear differential equation. As well 
as providing a flexible and smooth curve, this has the technical 
advantage of being easy to implement and fast to compute. The 
model differs from any other currently in the literature in that it 
incorporates a Bayesian prior, which helps to ensure that the 
discount function is well-behaved.
1. A similar approach is discussed in Vasicek and Fong [52].
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1.3 Basic definitions and assumptions
1.3.1 Bond
A bond is defined as a finite sequence of cash payments, the 
amount and timing of which is known in advance.1 In accordance 
with common practice it is assumed that the timing of a payment 
is adequately described by the date on which it is due. The range 
of dates on which a payment is possible is assumed to be limited 
to a (large) finite set. Under these conditions a bond is, from a 
mathematical point of view, a vector in the positive orthant of a 
finite-dimensional space:
b e  Q = 1
where b denotes the bond, Q the bond space, T the date space, 
and 9t+ the set of non-negative reals.
1. This excludes instruments that pay a variable amount of interest, or with unknown 
redemption date. Furthermore, it rules out credit risk: the models developed in this study 
are targeted at homogeneous and high-grade government bond markets.
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1.3.2 Bond market
In this study a bond market is modelled as akind of Arrow-Debreu 
market, where the commodity space is the bond space £2. The 
bond market discount function is the vector of (shadow) present 
values of one monetary unit payable on each possible payment 
date. The discount function is therefore a price vector for £2 
which is normalized so that the unit price of cash payable 
currently is one. If v denotes the discount function, the 
(theoretical) price p of a bond is, in standard notation:
p = b'v.
Even in the absence of taxation, the assumption that a bond 
market may be modelled in this way is very strong due to the 
existence in practice of circumstances capable of causing market 
segmentation. The following set of formal results illustrates the 
point.
Let B = {bi, b2, .. .bH} be the array of bonds in a given market and
(Xq e  SR+ be the vector of total amounts in existence. Consider 
the following assumptions:
A l. B and oq are exogenously determined.1
A2. A competitive equilibrium exists for the relevant economy 
such that each i-th investor chooses a portfolio oq e SKH and 
a payment for the portfolio of n^ e SR1, given a vector of 
bond prices p e 9tH.
1. I.e. there is a sole issuer (e.g. the government) whose behaviour can be taken to be 
exogenous to the model. Individuals have no ability to modify B or cq by issuing new 
bonds or "selling short" existing ones.
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A3. There exists an i-th investor who’s investment choice can 
be described by an ordering defined on the set 
X = {x g 1 3 a g A ,3m g SR1: x = B a - e ^ } ,  where
A = {cxg | 0 < a  < cXo} and ex is the first T-dimensional
unit vector,1 and satisfying the strict monotonicity property:
xu x2 g X ,X j > x2 => xx >i x2.
A4. There exists an i-th investor who’s investment choice can 
be described by an ordering >{ defined on X as in A3, 
satisfying the time-preference property:2
x ltx2e  X ,£ g 9ti,x1> x 2- ( e ti- e ,2)(t1- t 2)£ = » x 1> i x2.
A5. The oq chosen by the i-th investor according to assumption 
A3 or A4 satisfies otj«  (Xq (segmentation condition).
A6. The Oj chosen by the i-th investor according to assumption
A3 or A4 belongs to the interior of A (non-segmentation 
condition).3
1. The notational convention adopted for vector inequalities is:
(y > x) <=>(Vi e Iry^ x ,)
(y>x) « ( V i e  Iiy^Xj)
( y » x ) o ( V i e  I : y s>Xi)
where y, x e  911.
2. This assumption, which implies strict monotonicity, is not much stronger, since it only 
requires in addition that money can be stored at no cost.
3. This assumption clearly implies the previous one.
-20-
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Theorem 1 (existence of a discount function)
Under A l- A3 and A6 there exists a discount function, i.e. a vector 
v g SR+ such that p = B'v and vt = 1. Under A1-A3 and A5 there 
exists a segmented discount function, i.e. a vector v g such 
that p > B'v and Vj = 1.
Proof
Consider the set Yj = {y e | 3 a  e A, 3m g SH1: m = p 'a ,
y = B(a — 0Ci) — e^m -  11^ )}. Clearly Yt is a convex and closed 
set. Furthermore n  91+ = {0}, since otherwise the i-th investor 
could choose a , m with B a — exm > Botj — e ^ ,  and therefore 
Boc-eiin B o t i - e ^ ,  which is impossible given the assumed 
choice of otj, nv So there must exist a hyperplane separating1 
and {0}, and supporting Yj through the origin:
3Vj e 9tT-  {0}, Vy G Y i, Ve G 9{J- {0}: y'Vi < 0 ,e 'Vi > 0.
Since then Vj»  0, one may take vM = 1 with no loss of generality. 
Furthermore:
V a g A, 3m g : m = p 'a , [B(a -  -  e^m -  mi)]'vi < 0
and therefore:
V a g A : (B'vi -  p)'(a -  Oj) < 0.
The proof is completed by comparing this expression with A5 
andA6. ■
1. By a variant of the separating hyperplane theorem strict separation is obtainable for 
- { 0}.
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Theorem 1 is central to discount function model building. The 
non-segmentation condition is unlikely in practice to fail because 
the whole of a bond in existence is held by only one investor, but 
could easily fail because there isn’t an investor that holds a strictly 
positive amount of all bonds. In this case it might be possible to 
partition the market into segments such that a segmented discount 
function applies to each one. If the segmented discount functions 
are denoted by Vj, then ph > bh'vj5 where strict inequality can occur 
only for the bonds not belonging to the j-th segment.
Theorem 2 (monotonicity of the discount function)
If A3 is replaced by A4 in the previous theorem, the (segmented 
or non-segmented) discount function can be chosen to be 
monotonically non-increasing.
Proof (outline)
Let S = ( se  SRT|3 e e  SR^Btu^e T :s > - ( e ti- e ,2)(t1- t 2)e} .
The separation then applies to Yj and S, and the proof is otherwise 
virtually identical to that of the previous theorem, except for the 
additional result that, since:
Ve e Vq, ^  e T : -[(e^ -  e^) (q -  t j  e ] \  > 0
one gets:
—v^i) (t, — ta) < 0. ■
Theorem 2 provides a very weak characterization of a discount 
function. In view of the following Theorem 3, much stronger 
constraints are usually required for actual estimation.
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Theorem 3 (uniqueness of the discount function)
If a discount function v exists for a price vector p * 0, it is unique 
if and only if B is of full row-rank, i.e. if the bond market is 
complete.
Proof
If B were not of full row-rank there would exist a non-null vector 
k such that B'k = 0. Then S e e  911: v = (v + k e ) /^  + k^ ) *  v and 
v would be another discount function. Conversely, if B were of 
full row-rank while \ 1 and v2 were two different discount 
functions, then B'(Vi -  v2) = 0, a contradiction. ■
Theorem 3 is of little comfort in practice since the uniqueness 
conditions are unlikely to be satisfied. If preferences were 
continuous, convex and sufficiently smooth,1 one could choose 
v to be the vector generating the hyperplane separating Yj 
and Si= (y e 5RT | 3 a  e A ,3m e 9^:y = B ( a - a i) - e 1(m -m i), 
B a -  e ^  >i Boq -  e ^ } .  Since Sj and Yj in general vary from 
investor to investor, unless a representative investor is assumed, 
this approach doesn’t provide a unique discount function. 
However, even a representative investor isn’t sufficient to 
remedy the lack of statistical identification of the discount 
function model. As discussed in section 1.4 some additional 
information is therefore required.
1. I.e. generated differentiable indifference curves. One may wish to restrict this argument 
to a neighbourhood of Bocj- e ^ .
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1.3.3 Yield
The traditional method of assessing the value of a bond is based 
on the "yield”. This is the internal rate of return on the money 
invested in the bond. In standard notation, if p is the market price 
of the bond, bn the n-th cash flow and t„ the time (in years) to the 
n-th cash flow, the (annual) yield1 is defined as the solution y to 
the following equation:
P = q(y> b)= Z  bn(l + y/100)~\
n
The shortcoming of the yield as a general criterion for bond 
valuation was pointed out long ago: all cash flows are valued on 
the basis of the same discount rate, and this is inconsistent with 
a variable term structure. The reason why this approach is still 
so commonly used by investors and dealers alike is that a yield 
can be calculated from an individual price while a set of different 
discount rates for each cash flow usually must be estimated. 
Yields are used extensively in this study despite the focus on 
discount functions because they are often more easy to 
understand than prices and provide a more straightforward 
comparison with certain other models.
1. Hereafter the notion of yield used will, unless expressly stated, be that of f-annual yield, 
obtained by applying to the annual yield the transformation 100 f  [(1 + y/100)1/f- 1], where 
f  is the coupon frequency.
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1.3.4 Yield surface
Postulating a discount function model has strong implications 
for the structure of yields. To illustrate this fact it is first useful 
to make a simplification: given the coupon frequency,1 a bond 
can usually be described to a good approximation by its coupon 
and life. So, in mathematical notation, taking frequency as a 
known parameter and denoting coupon and life by c and t, one 
may write:
b = b(c, t).
Since, as shown previously, the yield is by definition a function 
of bond and price,2 one may also write:
y=y(p> b).
Finally, if the price of a bond is determined in accordance with 
the (non-segmented) discount function approach, it is a function 
of bond and discount function, i.e.:
p = p(v, b).
Therefore, substituting appropriately, one gets: 
y = y (P(v, b(c, t)), b(c, t))= z(v, c, t)
i.e. the yield depends on discount function, coupon and life.
1. The coupon is the amount of interest paid on the bond in the course of one year. The 
frequency is the number of instalments in which the coupon is paid.
2. It is shown that, under realistic assumptions, the equation defining the yield always has 
a unique solution.
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For any given v* the function y = z(v‘, c, t) describes what is
known as the "yield surface". It is easily shown that a yield 
surface uniquely defines a discount function. However, not all 
functions can be yield surfaces according to this approach; in 
fact, roughly speaking, given one slice of the surface, e.g. a 
"coupon yield curve" obtained by fixing the coupon at an arbitrary 
level c* to get the function y = z(v*,c\t), the rest of the surface 
is also determined. This set-up has, therefore, strong implications 
for the structure of yields.
A graph of a yield surface that has been calculated by taking an 
estimated par yield curve,1 working out the implied discount 
function and from that obtaining the rest of the surface is given 
below. The par yield curve generating the graph is also drawn 
as a dark line across the surface. This corresponds to the 
intersection of the surface with the plane where yield is equal to 
coupon.2
1. The par yield curve corresponding to the yield surface y = z(v*, c, t) is the function: 
y = z(v*, c(v*,t),t)
where c = c(v*,t) is the solution to the equation:
100=p(v*,b(c,t))
1.e. describes the path over the yield surface where the price of the bond is equal to par.
2. In this stylized setting, if a bond is priced at par on a coupon payment date, the yield is 
equal to the coupon. In between coupon payment dates, this equality is only approximately 
true.
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Yield surface
yield life (years)
The graph above provides some insight into a feature of empirical 
yields commonly known as the "duration effect".1 This consists 
in the tendency for high-coupon bonds to yield more than 
low-coupon bonds in what may be loosely described as a 
"downward-sloping yield curve environment", and vice versa in 
an "upward-sloping yield curve environment". The reason for 
this is related to the notion of duration, from which the name 
derives.
1. The duration effect is a special case of "coupon effect". The coupon effect is the tendency, 
common to most bond markets, for yields to depend on coupon as well as on maturity. The 
dependency may be ascribed to the duration effect, or may be due to other factors, usually 
taxation. An example of well-defined "taxation effect" is discussed in the analysis of the 
UK gilt market.
- 2 7 -
1.3.5 Duration effect
Duration (Macaulay duration) is defined as the weighted average 
life of the bond’s cash flows, where the weights are the present 
values of the payments calculated using the bond’s yield as 
discount rate. An equivalent and often more useful definition is 
that duration is the point percentage change in price 
corresponding to a unit change in the instantaneous yield y:1
d(y, b) = -100 d In q(y, b)/3y.
A commonly held belief on the part of market participants is that 
bonds should tend to have similar yields when they have similar 
durations rather than lifes. More precisely:
y(b) = f(d(y(b), b))
where f(.) is a given function. This could help to explain the 
duration effect, but is inconsistent with the assumed discount 
function model. The latter implies that the yield depends on the 
profile of cash flows, but not that it is only a function of duration. 
It can actually be shown that the two conditions could be satisfied 
only if the term structure of yields were flat.2 The reason for the 
belief lies mainly in the portfolio immunization techniques used 
by many fund managers, and particularly in the simplistic 
assumptions underlying those techniques.3
1. The instantaneous yield is obtained by applying the transformation 100 ln(l + y/100) to 
the annual yield, i.e. is analogous to the instantaneous rate of interest.
2. For a proof of this result see the appendix.
3. This point is further discussed in the appendix.
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It can be shown that, in a discount function model:1
i) the sign of the duration effect at a given maturity is 
determined independently of coupon level
ii) the duration effect is positive at a given maturity if the yield, 
for any coupon level, is lower than the annuity yield2 at the 
preceding maturity. The duration effect is negative if the 
converse is true.
1. For a proof of these results see the appendix.
2. The annuity yield is the yield on a bond with a principal repayment of zero. It is shown 
to be equal to the limit of the yield of a coupon bond when the coupon tends to infinity.
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1.4 A simple discount function model
The basic discount function model used in this chapter and the next is 
of the form:
i.e. is a classical linear model. The main difficulty with this model is 
that it is over-parameterized, since in most realistic situations the 
dimension of v, i.e. the number of dates on which a cash payment can 
be made, is much greater than the number of bonds that can be used 
for the estimation.1
One way around the problem is to restrict the parameter space by 
re-parameterizing the discount function, i.e. to postulate:
and then estimate the (possibly non-linear) model equation:
Ph = b,hv+eb
0 otherwise
ifh  = k
v = v(p)
Ph = b'hv(P)+eh.
1. The US Treasury market comes close to having enough bonds relative to the number of 
payment dates.
Another method, which effectively amounts to enlarging the 
observation space, consists in adding a Bayesian prior to the original 
equation,1 to obtain:2
Ph = bh/v + eh
«v) = M-i
<
Ee„, m = 0, Etyr, = 0, E iy y  p,|i„ =
On empirical grounds, the best solution appears almost invariably to 
be a mixture of the two approaches. The model used is therefore of 
the form:
Ph = bh' v(P) +  eh
fi(v(P)) = m < - a 
_  if h = k, 1 = m
Eeh,^i1 = 0,Eehp1 = 0,Eehek,^ 1Mta = j h .
[0 otherwise.
The choice of functions v(.) and fj(.) should take into account the fact 
that, under the assumptions stated in section 1.3.2:
i) a discount function can be chosen to be monotonically 
non-increasing
ii) v0= l .
1. This is an extension of the mixed estimation methodology advocated by Theil and 
Goldberger (see e.g. Theil, Principles of Econometrics, 1971).
2. Care must be taken in choosing the prior to avoid inconsistencies with the discount 
function parameterization.
oJ,6f ifh  = k,l = m 
0 otherwise.
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The choice of v(.) should also, possibly, be linear in p, to make for 
computational simplicity. A method that, on the basis of empirical 
trials, seems to give consistently satisfactory results is to use an 
expression of the form:
K
vt(P)= E pkexp(-rkt)+ 1 -  S  pk exp(-rK+1t)
k= 1 V k=1 J
where the rates rk follow some pattern. For this purpose, a geometric 
progression is found to be convenient and adequate, although other 
patterns perform well. Since the results are almost invariably little 
affected by quite large changes in the set of rates used, the method 
adopted is to choose a starting value rx and a ratio r0 on the basis of a 
large sub-sample of data, and then keep these fixed for the whole 
sample. This formulation appears to be capable of producing all sorts 
of humped shapes1 and to be generally well-behaved at the extremes 
of the sample. No attempt has been made to provide a basis for this 
functional form in terms of a specified economic model of the term 
structure, although the fact that it is the solution to a linear differential 
equation suggests that this might be possible.
The Bayesian prior functions ft(.) are always taken to be of the form: 
frfvO = (Aln)2v^
i.e. the prior probability distribution of forward instantaneous yields 
is chosen to be a geometric martingale.2 The prior has generally not 
been found to be necessary to produce sensible results, and is never 
taken to be so strong as to make an appreciable difference to the actual 
fit. Its main purpose is that, in the case of more complex situations,
1. E.g. with k = 4 it is usually easy to pick up 2 humps.
2. As for any prior, this choice is largely arbitrary. It is worth noting that it implies positive 
forward yields.
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and in particular in the case of the gilt model, it speeds up convergence 
significantly by helping the iterations to find the right path to the 
optimum.
Anotherproblem with this model is the estimation of the error variance. 
The simplest approach is to assume homoscedasticity. In practice this 
is likely to be inaccurate, since one would expect the pricing accuracy 
to be very much related to the bid-offer spread. The latter is, in fact, 
the cost to the arbitrageur of one leg of the "round-trip" into and back 
out of a relatively cheap bond from a relatively dear one. The cost of 
the other leg depends on the bid-offer spread of the other bond(s) 
involved in the "switch", and therefore cannot be determined a priori. 
The bid-offer spread on a given issue depends on a number of factors, 
but an important one is volatility,1 which usually increases with 
duration. The latter or some related variable may, therefore, provide 
a rough guide for the pricing error standard deviation. If the standard 
error were homogeneous in duration, using this result would be very 
similar to fitting the model in the yield space under homoscedasticity.2
1. I.e. the annualized standard deviation of the return on an investment of one unit.
2. Let eg and ^  be the errors in price and yield respectively on the h-th bond. Then, to a 
linear approximation:
£g=[aph/0yh]^
where the derivative is computed at the current price. Therefore OLS in the yield space 
consists in minimizing:
X(eD2~ Keg/tap./ayj)2h h
which is approximately the same as WLS in the price space if it is assumed that: 
oj;=[dph% h]ay.
If duration dh were used instead of [5ph/3yJ, the result would be similar, since:
dh = -[dPh%h] [100/pJ [3yb/9yJ
and [100/pJ [dyi/dyd is approximately constant.
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In practice, there is little evidence that such an approximation is much 
more accurate than the simpler homoscedastic assumption. This point 
is discussed in greater detail with reference to the UK gilt market in 
section 4.5.
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II. TWO CASE STUDIES
2.1 The German Bund market
2.1.1 Introduction
The West German bond market is the third largest in the world, 
but only a relatively small proportion of it consisting essentially 
of bonds (and notes) issued by the Federal government is actively 
traded.1 There are three categories of government issues that are 
truly liquid by international standards; these are the 
Bundesanleihen, the Bundesobligationen, and the 
Bundeskassenobligationen. With the exception of one bond, 
which is neglected hereafter, all three categories consist of 
straight bullets.2 But there are significant differences that cause 
these instruments to trade on separate markets.
Bundeskassenobligationen are notes issued with maturities of up 
to just under 6 years. Although actively traded over the counter, 
especially when recently issued, they are not officially quoted on 
the stock exchanges. Therefore the market is less transparent 
than in the case of Bundesanleihen or Bundesobligationen.
1. Much emphasis is put hereafter on the need for liquidity. This is for two reasons. Firstly, 
only if a bond market is liquid is it possible to obtain a data set that accurately reflects the 
prices at which market participants would have been prepared to trade at a specified moment 
in time. Secondly, a discount function model is ill suited to coping with differences in 
liquidity amongst bonds.
2. A "bullet" is the standard bond, consisting exclusively of coupon payments at fixed dates 
throughout its life and a principal repayment on a fixed redemption date. So, for example, 
a "callable" bond, i.e. a bond that may be redeemed early in certain circumstances, is not 
a bullet. A "straight" (bond) consists exclusively of coupons and principal repayment of 
fixed predetermined amounts. So, for example, a "floating rate note", i.e. a bond that pays 
variable amounts of interest on coupon payment dates, is not a straight.
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Furthermore, Bundeskassenobligationen do not benefit after 
issue from the regulatory intervention of the Bundesbank (see 
below), which helps to maintain liquidity in all issues. An 
important consequence is that foreign investor participation is 
relatively scarce, whereas in recent years it has been a major 
determinant of the prices of Bundesanleihen. So 
Bundeskassenobligationen usually trade at a yield spread above 
comparable Bundesanleihen.
Bundesobligationen are notes issued with maturities of around 5 
years on a tap basis. Their main distinctive feature was until 
recently the fact that foreign investors were not allowed to 
purchase them.1 This limitation affects most of the sample period 
used for the model estimation.
Bundesanleihen, known more commonly as "Bund", are bonds 
issued usually with maturities of around 10 years. There are 
approximately 80 Bund in existence, with maturities of up to 
almost 30 years. The two longest maturity Bund are due for 
redemption in the year 2016 and are the only really long Bund. 
This leaves a large gap in the maturity spectrum between 10 and 
30 years. The size of Bund issues is usually of DM l-5bn, with 
the most recent ones at the higher end of the range. Recent issues 
are therefore relatively large by international standards, and this 
enhances their liquidity. In terms of overall size the Bund market 
is not, however, all that large, amounting to only about DM 
150bn.2
1. This limitation has been suppressed with effect from 3 October 1988.
2. About half the size of the UK gilt market.
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2.1.2 The market place
The Bundesanleihen market is carefully regulated by the 
Bundesbank, which intervenes daily on the stock exchanges to 
maintain liquidity and prevent erratic price movements. As a 
result, even issues that were made long ago and are therefore 
infrequendy traded are priced in line with the rest of the market.
The important role played by the German central bank on the 
stock exchanges in determining the price of Bund should not, 
however, lead one to think that the nature of the market is so 
special as to make a comparison with the other markets covered 
in this study relatively meaningless. While the stock exchanges 
represent a point of reference and ensure liquidity for the less 
liquid Bund, the vast majority of the turnover is carried out 
over-the-counter, and a very sizeable proportion of this business 
is in London.1
The method of issue used for Bund deserves special mention 
since it affects the structure of yields in the 8-10 year maturity 
range. Bund are issued to a syndicate of banks which, in exchange 
for a re-allowance of 1.375%, underwrite the issue and undertake 
to place it with firm investors. If at any time up to one year after 
issue the Bundesbank purchases the bond below par in the course 
of its open market operations on the stock exchanges, it is deemed 
that the bond in question was badly placed, and the syndicate 
member responsible is obliged to repay to the Bundesbank most 
of the re-allowance (1%).
1. This is obviously the case for UK gilts, and is also the case for Dutch government bullets.
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During the first year after issue Bund can be transmitted in two 
forms: free or restricted. When Bund are sold in restricted form 
the purchaser undertakes, in exchange for a lower price, to ensure 
that the bonds are not sold on to the Bundesbank below par within 
a year from issue. If a purchaser of Bund in restricted form 
doesn’t fulfil this undertaking the seller can reclaim the discount 
given and will in turn himself be liable for any discount obtained. 
When Bund are sold in free form the purchaser assumes no such 
obligation.
Immediately after issue "free form" stock is relatively scarce, and 
trades at a lower yield. The relative scarcity of free Bund declines 
steadily, until after 1 year all Bund can be sold freely. Stock sold 
on the stock exchanges must always be in free form. This helps 
to ensure that, on stock exchange data, yields between 8 and 10 
years form a hump, as holders of restricted Bund try to avoid 
selling, whereas holders of Bund that have recently become free 
often want to sell.
Another major factor contributing to the hump in the 8 to 10 year 
maturities is liquidity, which tends to depress yields of newly 
issued Bund, and also causes the hump to become particularly 
pronounced during rallies and in periods of intense speculative 
interest on the part of foreign investors. Finally, the hump is also 
enhanced by the fact that yields in the 9-10 year area are depressed 
by the big gap in the spectrum of maturities between 10 and 30 
years.
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2.1.3 Empirical results
The Bund model was estimated for the period 1987-88 using 
daily data obtained from Bloomberg (which closely reflect stock 
exchange fixings) and Reuters (which are stock exchange 
fixings). Up to 1 June 1988 only 15-20 Bund were used and the 
main source was Reuters, whereas thereafter the whole market 
(i.e. around 80 issues) was used and the main source was 
Bloomberg.
The discount function formulation that seems best to fit the data 
over the two year period is:
v,(p)= I  (VO+rJ + f l -  I  pJ/(l+rK+1)1 
k = i  V k = i  J
where:
K = 4 
r1 = l% 
r2 = 3% 
r3 = 9% 
r4 = 27% 
r5 = 81%.
Relatively large changes to the set of rates {rk} make only little 
difference to the final result.1 So does changing K to 3 or 5.
A graph of the standard error over the two-year period covered 
is provided below. The graph would suggest a structural break 
on 1 June 1988. This is, however, due to the change in data set
1. So the figures have been conveniently rounded.
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mentioned above. In fact, up to that date relatively few Bund are 
used, and a large proportion of the data relates to "runners", i.e. 
Bund with maturities of 7-10 years, thus spanning the hump in 
the structure of yields where the fit of the model is distinctly 
worse.
S tandard erro r of Bund model
daily data 1987-88
0.9
0.7 First data set
0.6 Second data set
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
02-Jan-87 16-Apr-87 29-Jul-87 10-Nov-87 22-Feb-88 03-Jun-88 15-Sep-88 30-Dec-88
Of greater interest is the gradual improvement in the goodness 
of the fit throughout the two-year period. This might be partly 
due to an improvement in the quality of the data. But the more 
important factor is a reduction in the size of the hump. This has 
two explanations: firstly, the involvement of foreign investors - 
which have a higher preference for liquidity - decreased steadily 
relative to German domestic investors during the two years; 
secondly, the advent of increasing numbers of traders prepared 
to undertake yield curve arbitrage and the growing size of the 
issues involved helped to increase the liquidity in the 8-9 year 
maturity range.
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Estimation results for a day that was fairly average for the period 
1 June - 31 December 1988 are given below:
Table 1. Estimation on 1 September 1988
p! = -0.23 s1 = 0.043 q = -5.2
P2= 0.47 s2 = 0.085 q = 5.5
p3= 0.90 s3 = 0.063 II
p4 = -0.13 s4 = 0.027
00III*5"
p5 = -0.01 s5 = 0.007 q = -1.6
ir  = 0.998 SE = 0.23
observations = 76 degrees of freedom = 72
(  4Note: model estimated under the constraint P5 = 1 -  Z  Pk
\ k = 1
The graphs below overlay the par yield curve obtained from the 
yield surface estimated on 1 September 1988, with the yields of 
the individual Bund used in the estimation. It is apparent from 
the graphs and the following table that there is no obvious coupon 
effect. This is due to the fact that, since issuance occurs almost 
entirely in the 10-year area, and new issues are always made at 
coupons such as to ensure prices close to par, the dispersion of 
coupon levels within a given maturity range is small, and it isn’t 
therefore possible to distinguish a coupon effect from a maturity 
or liquidity effect. Even in those cases where a coupon effect 
could emerge, this is swamped by the fact that the stocks with 
higher coupons usually correspond to the earlier issues which, 
being less liquid, tend to attract a higher yield.
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Bund market yield structure
on 1 September 1988
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Table 2. Bund list on 1 September 1988
# stock price yield
1 Bund 6.5 1-Dec-88 100.30 4.862
2 Bund 6.75 1-Jan-89 100.80 3.859
3 Bund 10 1-Apr-89 102.30 5.424
4 Bund 7.25 1-Apr-89 101.25 4.716
5 Bund 7.5 1-Jun-89 101.80 4.786
6 Bund 8 1-Jul-89 102.00 5.257
7 Bund 8 1-Aug-89 101.70 5.875
8 Bund 7.5 1-Sep-89 101.75 5.524
9 Bund 7.75 1-Nov-89 102.10 5.772
10 Bund 7.75 1-Jan-90 102.25 5.871
11 Bund 10 1-Apr-90 
1-May-90
105.90 5.883
12 Bund 5.75 99.90 5.804
13 Bund 8.25 1-Jul-90 103.95 5.866
14 Bund 7.75 1-Nov-90 103.60 5.897
15 Bund 8.25 1-Nov-90 104.50 5.936
16 Bund 9 1-Feb-91 106.50 5.969
17 Bund 7.5 1-Jun-91 103.55 6.025
18 Bund 10.25 1-Jul-91 110.40 6.100
19 Bund 10.75 1-Sep-91 112.35 6.081
20 Bund 10 1-Dec-91 111.00 6.118
21 Bund 9.75 1-Jan-92 110.40 6.158
22 Bund 9.75 1-Mar-92 110.85 6.164
23 Bund 9.5 1-Apr-92 
1-May-92
110.40 6.137
24 Bund 9 109.00 6.152
25 Bund 8.5 1-Jun-92 107.60 6.140
26 Bund 9 1-Aug-92 109.95 6.040
27 Bund 8.75 1-Sep-92 109.00 6.125
28 Bund 7.75 1-Dec-92 105.70 6.162
29 Bund 7.5 1-Jan-93 104.80 6.179
30 Bund 7.5 1-Mar-93 104.80 6.226
31 Bund 6 1-Mar-93 99.45 6.135
32 Bund 8.25 1-Jun-93 107.65 6.314
33 Bund 8 1-Jul-93 106.80 6.308
34 Bund 8.25 1-Aug-93 107.80 6.336
35 Bund 8.25 1-Oct-93 108.05 6.335
36 Bund 8.25 1-Nov-93 108.15 6.332
37 Bund 8.25 1-Dec-93 108.20 6.344
38 Bund 8.25 1-Jan-94 108.15 6.369
39 Bund 8.25 1-Feb-94 108.15 6.394
40 Bund 8 18-Mar-94 107.00 6.443
41 Bund 8.25 20-Jun-94 108.35 6.464
42 Bund 8.25 20-Jul-94 108.30 6.498
43 Bund 8.25 22-Aug-94 108.45 6.490
44 Bund 7.5 20-Oct-94 104.77 6.523
45 Bund 7 20-Dec-94 102.50 6.492
46 Bund 7 20-Jan-95 102.30 6.533
47 Bund 7.25 20-Feb-95 103.45 6.559
48 Bund 7.625 20-Mar-95 105.45 6.563
49 Bund 7.5 20-Apr-95
22-May-95
104.70 6.590
50 Bund 7.25 103.45 6.590
51 Bund 7 20-Jun-95 102.15 6.589
52 Bund 6.75 20-Jul-95 100.80 6.598
53 Bund 6.5 20-Oct-95 99.40 6.603
54 Bund 6.375 22-Jan-96 98.33 6.657
55 Bund 6.375 20-Feb-96 98.33 6.652
56 Bund 5.75 20-Jun-96 94.38 6.693
57 Bund 5.75 22-Jul-96 94.19 6.720
58 Bund 5.5 20-Sep-96 92.53 6.730
59 Bund 6.5 20-Dec-96 98.66 6.706
60 Bund 6.125 20-Jan-97 96.08 6.741
61 Bund 5.75 20-Feb-97 93.58 6.758
62 Bund 6 20-Mar-97 95.13 6.762
63 Bund 5.5 20-May-97 91.73 6.783
64 Bund 6.125 21-Jul-97 95.83 6.761
65 Bund 6.375 20-Aug-97 97.44 6.762
66 Bund 6.75 22-Sep-97 99.94 6.754
67 Bund 6.375 20-Oct-97 97.53 6.741
68 Bund 6.375 20-Jan-98 97.37 6.751
69 Bund 6.25 20-Feb-98 96.52 6.747
70 Bund 6.125 20-Mar-98 95.64 6.753
71 Bund 6 20- Apr-98 
20-May-98
94.64 6.768
72 Bund 6.5 98.19 6.753
73 Bund 6.75 20-Jul-98 99.78 6.777
74 Bund 6 20-Oct-98 94.43 6.773
75 Bund 6 20-Jun-16 82.95 7.465
76 Bund 5.625 20-Sep-16 77.70 7.557
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2.1.4 Conclusions
The absence of an obvious coupon effect in the German Bund 
market suggests that a naive yield curve model fitted to Bund 
yields irrespective of coupon level would for practical purposes 
provide as good a representation of the market as a discount 
function model. While this fact is difficult to deny, it is also true 
that the latter has at least the advantage of generality in that, as 
illustrated in the following sections, the same formulation of the 
model appears to be effective in different markets.
In absolute terms, the fit of the Bund model during the period 1 
June - 31 December 1988 is good, in the sense that the standard 
error is usually smaller than the average bid-offer spread.1 In 
relative terms, over the same period the Bund model also 
compares favourably with the gilt model, with a standard error 
roughly equal to half that obtained on UK gilts.2 This ought to 
be expected given the complicated tax effects that exist in the 
case of gilts. But the fit of the Bund model is not as good as that 
of the Dutch government bullet model illustrated in the next 
paragraph. This is probably due to the absence of a "hump effect" 
in the latter. One may conclude that a weakness of discount 
function models is probably the difficulty in coping with liquidity 
effects. This is, however, a problem with virtually all models of 
bond markets.
1. The bid-offer spread varies from 0.10-0.20 percentage points on the most recent and 
therefore almost invariably most liquid issues, to 0.20-0.30 percentage points on other liquid 
issues (the vast majority), to a maximum of 0.50-1.00 percentage points on the two long 
bonds. This compares with a standard error which is usually of 0.15-0.30 percentage points.
2. The SE on gilts varies in a 0.35-0.55 percentage point range.
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2.2 The Dutch government bullet market
2.2.1 Introduction
The Dutch bond market is the oldest in the world, and it was the 
financial techniques developed in this market that, exported to 
England at the time of the Glorious Revolution, formed the basis 
of the modem day UK gilt market. However, by contemporary 
standards, the Dutch bond market is on the whole antiquated, 
generally lacking in liquidity and depth. As a result, only a small 
proportion of it is truly liquid and internationally traded.
The most liquid Dutch bonds are those issued by the government, 
which account for roughly two thirds of the total volume 
outstanding. The vast majority of Dutch bonds in existence 
include sinking fund arrangements1 with or without additional 
early redemption or extension options.2 Indeed, until 1 January 
1986 this was the only type of bond allowed for official listing.
Sinking fund bonds, while very popular with domestic issuers 
and investors alike, have a number of disadvantages. The relative
1. Bonds issued with sinking fund arrangements are redeemed by instalments on a number 
of dates (usually spanning several years) according to a pre-established schedule. The 
bonds to be redeemed on any given date are, with the exception of the final instalment, 
selected by random drawing which takes place shortly before the partial redemption date. 
Therefore, the owner of a sufficiently large holding can expect his bonds to be redeemed 
in proportion to the amounts scheduled for each drawing; the same applies to the owner 
of bonds held in a large pool, as is the case when the custodian is one of a number of 
settlement agencies. Since a large proportion of investors fall into one of these two 
categories, it might be sensible to apply a discount function model to the expected cash 
flows, effectively treating a sinking fund bond as a basket of bullets with a nominal value 
equal to a fraction of par.
2. It is common in the Dutch bond market for sinking fund bonds to include provisions 
whereby the government has the option to redeem the bonds outstanding on certain dates 
at pre-established prices (callable bonds), or the holder has the option to convert on certain 
dates the bonds into other bonds of longer maturity (extendible bonds).
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complexity of their cash flow pattern ensures that it is difficult 
to make comparisons of value between different issues, and also 
makes it more awkward to use them in conjunction with interest 
rate or currency swaps.1 Furthermore, when redemptions start, 
the size of the issue shrinks rapidly, and therefore sinking fund 
bonds tend to become very illiquid. For these and other reasons 
they are generally disliked by international investors, who require 
a higher yield to be induced to buy them.
With effect from 1 January 1986 the Dutch government decided 
to lift the existing restrictions on bullet bonds, and immediately 
started to issue bullets on a large scale. These issues have proved 
a great success, especially with foreign investors. The Dutch 
government bullets, of which over 20 issues are now in existence, 
are by far the most liquid Dutch bonds. Whereas the overall size 
of the Dutch government bullet market is very small, the 
individual issues are rather large, usually around Dfl 3-5bn, and 
this enhances their liquidity. However, the spectrum of 
maturities available is narrow, ranging only from 4 to 10 years. 
A significant proportion of trading in these bonds is done in 
London, which makes the market directly comparable with the 
other markets examined in this study.
Despite their dislike for sinking fund bonds, foreign investors 
have always maintained a significant presence in the Dutch bond 
market. This is largely due to the favourable tax treatment2 and, 
especially in recent years, to the hard currency status of the 
Guilder. When the Dutch government bullet market was bom it
1. In brief, these are agreements whereby cash flows are "swapped" for other cash flows 
determined e.g. by a variable interest rate as opposed to a fixed one (interest rate swap), or 
denominated in a different currency (currency swap). These transactions represent an 
extremely large and growing volume of business in the more advanced financial markets.
2. Dutch bonds have never been subject to withholding tax and occasional rumours that a 
tax might be introduced have never been taken very seriously.
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was from the start dominated by foreign investors, and as such 
it is one of the best examples of a bond market with virtually no 
tax effects. In this it contrasts strongly with the sinking fund 
segment of the bond market, which is affected in much the same 
way as the UK gilt market1 by the presence of domestic investors 
with a strong tax-induced preference for capital gain relative to 
income.
1. See chapter III.
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2.2.2 Empirical results
The Dutch government bullet model was estimated using daily 
data covering the whole of 1988 obtained from Bloomberg. 
Because the market was so new there were only 11 bonds in 
existence at the beginning of the year, whereas by the end of the 
year there were 19. All available bond prices were used in the 
estimation.
As illustrated in the graph below, the model standard error 
appears to decline substantially throughout the sample period. 
This is probably due to the fact that, as the size of the market 
increased from its initial minuteness, the liquidity and pricing 
accuracy improved.
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Throughout, the standard error is almost always within the 
bid-offer spread.1 As indicated previously, the fit also compares 
favourably with that of the Bund model.2
The discount function formulation used for Bund was found to 
be adequate for Dutch bullets and so was kept unchanged. Again, 
it was found that relatively large changes to the set of rates {rk}, 
including changing K, make little difference to the f it Estimation 
results for 1 September 1988, which are reasonably 
representative of the performance of the model, are given below:
Table 3. Estimation on 1 September 1988
P ,=  1.72 Si = 0.82 q = 2.1
ft, = -2.76 s2= 1.38
©ri1II
f t=  2.53 s3= 0.71 t3 = 3.6
ft, = -0.56 s4= 0.18 t4= -3.2
'OooIIv>
CO. s5= 0.03 ts= 2.4
1 ?=  0.984 SE= 0.15
observations = 17 degrees of freedom =13
(  4 'INote: model estimated under the constraint P5 = 1 -  X P*
V k=l J
1. This is usually 0.20-0.30 percentage points, compared to a standard error ranging between
0.10 and 0.30 percentage points most of the time.
2. The average standard error of 0.19 is about 15% lower than that obtained on Bund over 
the second sample period.
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The graphs below overlay the par yield curve calculated from the 
estimated yield surface on 1 September 1988 with the yields of 
the individual bonds in existence at the time and used in the 
estimation. From the graphs and the following table it is apparent 
that a coupon effect may exist, although it is not clear cut. This 
is probably due to the fact that the dispersion of coupons is very 
small and, in view of the relative flatness of the yield structure, 
the predicted effect would in any case be extremely small.1
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1. A 1 % point difference in coupon ata maturity of 10 years should, according to the model, 
be worth less than 0.01% in yield terms.
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Table 4. Dutch gov’t bullet list on 1 September 1988
# stock price yield
i Nether 7 15-Nov-93 103.00 6.293
2 Nether 6.25 15-Feb-94 99.30 6.389
3 Nether 6 15-Jun-94 98.15 6.386
4 Nether 6 1-Jul-94 98.15 6.385
5 Nether 6.5 1-Oct-94 100.45 6.398
6 Nether 6.25 15-Jan-95 ’A’ 98.70 6.491
7 Nether 6.25 15-Jan-95 ’B’ 98.70 6.491
8 Nether 6 15-Apr-95 97.20 6.522
9 Nether 6.25 1-May-95 98.50 6.528
10 Nether 6.25 1-Jun-95 98.50 6.524
11 Nether 6.5 15-Apr-96 99.60 6.558
12 Nether 6 15-May-96 96.45 6.596
13 Nether 6.25 1-Aug-96 98.00 6.576
14 Nether 6.5 15-Aug-96 99.60 6.561
15 Nether 6.25 15-Feb-97 97.60 6.613
16 Nether 6.375 15-Dec-97 98.00 6.662
17 Nether 6.5 15-Jul-98 98.80 6.665
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2.2.3 Conclusions
The fact that the same model used for Bund can be applied to 
Dutch bullets to yield such sensible results confirms the 
usefulness of this type of approach. This remains true despite 
the observation that one of the main theoretical advantages of 
using discount functions compared to yield based methodologies,
i.e. the accurate measurement of the duration effect, is in practice 
often not very important for the purpose of describing the yield 
structure. The accurate measurement of the duration effect is, 
however, generally much more important for pricing purposes. 
This is illustrated in the graphs below.
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Price equivalent of duration effect
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It would appear that discount functions really come into their 
own for picking up coupon effects only when the dispersion of 
coupons is great and, possibly, when taxation is the main cause. 
This is illustrated in the following study of the UK gilt market.
-53-
in . THE UK GILT MARKET
3.1 Introduction
UK gilts or gilt-edged stocks are sterling-denominated bonds issued 
on the domestic market by the UK Treasury or bearing the guarantee 
of the UK government. The gilt-edged market is the third largest 
government bond market in the world1 and is one of the most liquid. 
There are two main categories of gilts: "conventional gilts" and 
"index-linked gilts". The distinguishing factor is that conventional 
gilts have fixed coupons and are redeemed at par, whereas in the case 
of index-linked gilts the coupons and the principal repayment are 
indexed to the RPI. Conventional gilts form the bulk of the market, 
with about 100 different stocks in existence.2 There are relatively few 
index-linked gilts, since they were first issued only in 1981 and they 
have not yet been relied upon much by the Treasury as a source of 
finance.3 Because of their special features, index-linked gilts trade on 
a separate market from conventional gilts, and often behave quite 
independently of the latter. The remainder of this analysis will focus 
on conventional gilts.
Most conventional gilts are redeemed within a fixed time period, i.e. 
are "dated". However, six of them are "undated", i.e. can be redeemed 
at the Treasury’s request after certain fixed dates, with no other time
1. After the US and Japanese markets. But if bills were included it would be overtaken by 
the Italian market.
2. At the time of writing, this number is rapidly declining because of the absence of new 
issues.
3. This is partly due to the fact that the market for index-linked gilts took time to develop, 
and partly that the sharp decline and then reversal in the public sector borrowing requirement 
made it unnecessary to issue large amounts of stock.
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limit. 1 In practice, however, since the coupons on these gilts are very 
low, it is unlikely that the Treasury will wish to redeem them in the 
foreseeable future, and therefore undated gilts are treated by the market 
as though they were irredeemable. Because they were issued long ago 
and in current nominal terms have a relatively small size, they are very 
illiquid, and tend to appeal to a small subset of investors. In the rest 
of this study undated gilts will be ignored.
Conventional dated gilts are either redeemed on a fixed date, or at the 
Treasury’s request within two specified dates. These "double-dated" 
gilts include therefore an option in favour of the Treasury. If the option 
is "at the money", i.e. the price of the gilt is close to par, the double-dated 
gilt should be expected to yield more than a comparable single-dated 
gilt, owing to the negative value of the option. In the gilt model, 
double-dated gilts that contain a substantial option value element are 
neglected, whereas double-dated gilts that are far "out of the money" 
are treated as single-dated gilts of the appropriate maturity.
Finally, certain gilts include an option in favour of the holder to convert 
on specified dates and at pre-established rates the gilt held into one or 
more others that may be created as a result of the conversion option 
being exercised. These "convertible gilts", of which few are in 
existence at any one time, are used in the gilt model only when the last 
conversion date has expired.
1. But one of these gilts incorporates a sinking fund arrangement
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3.2 The participants
3.2.1 Investors
The table below gives a break-down of the gilt market according 
to type of holder and maturity band:
Table 5. Nominal gilt holdings on 31 March 1988
percentage break-down by holder and maturity
years’ life: <5 5-15 >15
pension funds 0.9 9.9 1 0 .6
overseas holders 5.2 6 .2 0.9
personal sector 4.5 4.2 2 .1
life assurance 1 .2 1 2 .6 1 1 .1
general insurance 1.4 2.7 0.3
monetary sector 1.5 2 .6 2 .0
building societies 5.4 0 .6 0 .0
others 7.9 5.6 0.3
total 28.0 44.6 27.4
Sources: CSO, Bank of England, my estimates.
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It emerges that the largest investors in gilts are life assurance 
companies and pension funds. These dominate the medium and 
long maturities, with holdings amounting to almost two thirds of 
the total outstanding in those categories. Both groups have a 
preference for longer maturities since these reduce their overall 
portfolio risk in view of the extended time-profile of their 
liabilities. For tax reasons that are explained below life assurance 
companies have a relative preference for low-coupon gilts while 
pension funds prefer higher coupons.
The rest of the market, neglecting the residual, is almost equally 
divided amongst overseas sector, personal sector, and banks, 
building societies and insurance companies. The overseas sector 
holds mainly high-coupon short and medium maturities, 
especially FOTRA gilts. 1 The personal sector dominates the 
low-coupon gilts at short and medium maturities. Banks, 
building societies and insurance companies invest mainly in the 
medium and high-coupon short maturities.
These observations based on statistical data and anecdotal 
evidence are substantiated by the gilt model estimation results, 
which are based on endogenous segmentation and are therefore 
independently derived.
1. FOTRA is an acronym for "free of tax to residents abroad". A description of FOTRA 
gilts is given in section 3.4.1.
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3.2.2 Dealers
On 27 October 1986, date of the so-called Big Bang,1 the current 
structure of the gilt market came into being. The new market is 
based on gilt edged "market makers", i.e. dealers who have 
undertaken to quote continuous and realistic bid and offer prices 
to non market makers in a suitable number of gilts in appropriate 
size, and have been recognized as such by the Bank of England 
who constantly monitors and supervises their activity.
In exchange for this obligation, market makers have a number 
of privileges. They can display firm bids and offers to other 
market makers through the inter-dealer brokers’ screen-based 
systems, which protect their anonymity. They have direct access 
to the Bank of England’s dealing room. They can borrow gilts 
through the money brokers and can thus "sell short", i.e. sell gilts 
that they do not own.2
In addition to the market makers there are a few brokers who act 
as intermediaries between investors and market makers in an 
advisory capacity to the former.
1. The long-awaited reform of the Stock Exchange rules to comply with the Restrictive 
Practices Act
2. This capability is not cheap, since it costs usually 0.5-1% per annum. Also, there are 
many gilts that it is virtually impossible to borrow at any price. Typically, these are the 
low-coupon gilts that it would usually, for tax reasons, be most advantageous for market 
makers to sell short This point is explained in section 3.5.3.
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3.3 The market place
The increased competition that followed the abolition of restrictive 
practices with Big Bang caused a substantial reduction in dealing costs 
for investors. Bid and offer prices quoted by market makers now are 
net, i.e. they are inclusive of all charges to the purchaser. The bid-offer 
spread therefore represents the greater part of the total cost of dealing1 
and provides a good measure of the latter. Bid-offer spreads on gilts 
vary nowadays from less than 1/32 on gilts of very short maturities, to 
2-4/32 on liquid gilts of longer maturities, to 6-8/32 on less liquid gilts 
especially at longer maturities, and to possibly 16/32 on very illiquid 
issues. Wider spreads would apply in the case of abnormal sizes.
Since 10 February 1986 all gilt prices are quoted on a "clean” basis. 
A clean price is equal to the total price payable less the "accrued 
interest". The accrued interest is given by the formula:2
a = c [5/365]
where c is the coupon and 5 is the "days of accrual", that is the number 
of days between the last coupon payment date and settlement date3 if 
the gilt is traded "cum-dividend", i.e. inclusive of the next coupon 
payment, or minus the number of days between settlement date and 
the next coupon payment date if the gilt is traded "ex-dividend". Gilts 
are traded cum-dividend or ex-dividend according to the ex-dividend 
calendar published by the Bank of England. All the prices used in the 
UK gilt model estimation are for ordinary bargains, and the standard 
ex-dividend and settlement rules are therefore applied.
1. The investor will, of course, have to bear his own internal transaction costs and maybe 
external costs relating to settlement. Purchases of gilts are exempt from stamp duty.
2. A more complicated formula applies in the case of partly paid gilts.
3. Ordinary settlement is on the next business day, except in the case of an auction stock 
which is still trading on a "when issued” basis.
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3.4 Taxation of gilts
3.4.1 Income & capital gain
Holders of gilts are subject to taxation of income and of capital 
gain. The amount of taxable income is calculated on an accrual 
basis, whereas the relevant date is usually given by the payment 
date of the coupon to which the accrual relates. Before 28 
February 1986 taxable income was not calculated on an accrual 
basis, and therefore income could be converted into capital gain 
by selling cum dividend and buying ex; this used to give rise to 
"bond washing", whereby investors could convert income into 
capital gain and vice versa to take advantage of the different rates 
of tax. The only modest form of bond washing now available 
relates to tax-timing considerations, whereby investors who are 
subject to withholding tax have an incentive not to receive 
coupons1 and, provided that they are planning not to receive the 
coupons, to hold gilts with coupon payment dates at the beginning 
of their tax year.
As a rule, coupons are paid by the Bank of England net of the 
basic rate of income tax. In certain circumstances, usually when 
the investor is exempt from tax on income or subject to a reduced 
rate, the coupon may be paid gross. These special cases can be 
summarized as follows:
certain gilts (denominated FOTRA) may be exempted upon
request by the holder if he qualifies as a non-resident2
1. This is known as coupon washing.
2. For tax purposes non-residents are defined as individuals not ordinarily resident in the 
UK and companies managed and controlled outside the UK.
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gilts held by approved pension funds may be exempted upon 
request
gilts held by entities enjoying sovereign immunity may be 
exempted upon request
gilt holdings falling within the purview of an agreement to 
this effect between the UK and a foreign government may 
be exempted or subject to a lower rate of tax in accordance 
with the agreement.
The amount of taxable capital gain is calculated, consistently 
with the taxation of income, as the difference between sale (or 
redemption) and purchase price, net of accrued income. The 
relevant date for tax purposes is usually given by the date of 
disposal (or redemption).
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3.4.2 Taxation
Income and capital gains are subject to income tax or corporation 
tax. As from 2 July 1986 capital gains are no longer subject to 
capital gains tax, while remaining subject to corporation tax when 
they represent a component of a company’s ordinary trading 
profit. Investors in gilts may be broadly grouped into three 
categories, according to their tax status: gross, net and net net.
A. Gross investors
These don’t pay tax on either their income or their capital 
gains. Gross investors may be classified as follows:
Al. Approved pension funds and related business
A2. Residents abroad
These constitute rather a heterogeneous grouping, 
since double-taxation agreements may apply to them, 
and they may be subject to tax at various rates in their 
country of residence. 1 With regard to UK taxation, 
while exempt from tax on FOTRA gilts, they are 
subject to withholding tax on non-FOTRA gilts unless 
they are covered by a double-taxation agreement - and 
then only within the terms of the agreement - and in 
this case they therefore usually wash the coupon, i.e. 
they sell before the next ex-dividend date, thus 
avoiding the tax.
1. In a sense, they are therefore unclassifiable. However, in practice the majority of foreign 
investors behave as though they did not pay tax.
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B. Net investors
These pay tax on income but not on capital gains. They may 
be grouped as follows:
Bl. Life funds and most non-financial companies
These are subject to corporation tax on income only, 
not on capital gains.
B2. Personal sector and most investment companies
These are subject to income tax, or corporation tax and 
income tax on income only.
C. Net net investors
These are taxed on income and capital gains. The major 
representatives of this group are:
Cl. Banks, building societies, insurance companies and 
most other financial companies
These pay corporation tax on income and capital gains.
The portion of income and capital gains that represents the 
company’s ordinary trading profit is subject to corporation tax 
even in the case of gross or net funds. This doesn’t significantly 
alter the broad classification given above. However, during the 
sample period used in the gilt model estimation, life assurance 
and insurance companies that carried out a mixture of business 
subject to different regimes were taxed on the aggregate at the 
average rate applicable, rather than separately on the individual 
types of business. Therefore, most of these companies did not 
fall into any of the tax brackets above.
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3.4.3 Rates of tax1
The rates of income tax applicable to the sample period are as 
follows:
Table 6 . Rates of income tax
year minimum maximum
86/87 29% 60%
87/88 27% 60%
88/89 25% 40%
The rates of corporation tax applicable are as follows:
Table 7. Rates of corporation tax
year small companies2 standard
86/87 29% 35%
87/88 27% 35%
88/89 25% 35%
1. It may occur that an investor of a type that would usually be taxed enjoys total or partial 
relief because of special circumstances, e.g. because his personal income is sufficiently 
low. It is assumed that these cases carry negligible weight in gilt pricing.
2. Small companies that are not small enough to qualify for the lower rate may nonetheless 
enjoy partial tax relief.
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3.4.4 Conclusion
From the point of view of UK taxation one may distinguish three 
main types of investor. Gross investors, who pay no tax, and 
dominate the medium to high-coupon gilts of medium to long 
maturities. Net investors, who pay tax on income - but not on 
capital gains - at rates of up to 60% in 86/87 and 87/88, and of 
up to 40% in 88/89 and dominate the low to medium coupon gilts 
of medium to long maturities in the case of life funds1 and of 
short to medium maturities in the case of the personal sector. Net 
net investors, who pay tax on income and capital gains at rates 
of 29% to 35% in 86/87, of 27% to 35% in 87/88, and of 25% to 
35% in 88/89, and dominate the medium to high-coupon gilts of 
short maturities.
1. Note, however, the point made about life assurance companies in section 3.4.2.
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3.5 Gilt modelling literature
The UK gilt market has probably been modelled more than any other 
bond market over the past twenty years. This is largely due to the fact 
that the size of the market, the number of issues and the tax regulations1 
have, for many years, maintained a liquid market in a large number of 
issues spanning a wide range of coupons. Thus, models have been 
developed both for practical purposes, such as for fairly pricing new 
issues or detecting arbitrage opportunities, and for theoretical 
purposes, such as exploring the workings of a segmented market.
A "golden age" of gilt market analysis is probably now over, since the 
government’s buying-in policy and the lack of new issuance have 
dramatically reduced the size of many stocks and the number 
outstanding, thus concentrating liquidity in relatively few stocks and 
reducing the importance of the market as a whole. The following 
subsections provide a brief guide to the best known gilt models 
developed to date.
1. Which have generally encouraged stock switching activity.
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3.5.1 Bank of England model
The original Bank of England gilt model was based on the work 
of J. P. Burman and W. R. White, details of which are given in 
their article in the Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin [6 ], and 
underwent numerous minor modifications during the following 
fifteen years, as described in a series of articles [1 ,3 ,4 ,5], before 
being supplanted by a new approach - which is of little if any 
theoretical interest - as explained in a further article in the Bank 
of England Quarterly Bulletin [2]. With the benefit of hindsight 
the most obvious difficulty with the original model was the 
constant need to adjust the specification. This is largely due to 
some ad-hoc features of the model, that tend to restrict its 
generality.
In brief, the Burman and White approach consists in assuming 
that the gilt market is divided into two segments, one for shorter 
maturities and one for longer maturities; in each of these a 
representative investor expects to receive on all stocks a net 
holding yield up to a planning horizon, as determined by a 
prospective net redemption yield at the horizon; tax rates, 
expected net holding yield, planning horizon and prospective net 
redemption yield are assumed to be equal across stocks but 
different in each segment. The two price functions obtained are 
then spliced together to produce the market price function. 
Subsequent changes to the model affected the shape of the 
price-coupon relationship, which was changed from linear to 
convex, 1 and the splicing mechanism.
1. This is explained in the next section.
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3.5.2 Clarkson model
This approach is laid out in detail in Clarkson [13]. The main 
achievement of the Clarkson model was to emphasize the 
importance of segmentation. In models without segmentation 
the relationship between price and coupon is generally linear. 1 
For example, in the case of a flat net yield curve and a unique 
constant rate of coupon tax, the price of a bond on a coupon 
payment date would be given by:
p = c i  (1  -  t/100) (1  + y/1 0 0 )‘‘+ 1 0 0 (1  + y/1 0 0 )1*
i = 1
where p denotes the price, c the coupon, y the (annual) yield, T 
the rate of tax, t| the time in years to the i-th cash flow and n the 
number of cash flows.
Clarkson recognized that if investors paying different rates of tax 
were involved, the relationship between price and coupon could 
easily become convex.2 In fact, if selling short is not allowed, 
given a set I of investors, each of which is endowed in equilibrium 
with a linear indifference curve Pt(c) as described by a price 
equation of the type stated above, the actual bond price must lie 
on the lower boundary of the set {(p,c) e 9t21 p > p^c), Vi e 1} 
which is convex, being the intersection of (weakly) convex sets.
1. This type of result is very general. The US is an exception, since a kink occurs at par 
due to the option to amortise capital losses. The gilt model discussed in this study is linear 
within each market segment.
2. As explained in chapter I, this can occur even without differential taxation, but is then 
less likely.
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3.5.3 Schaefer model
Schaefer’s approach is similar to Clarkson’s in that it allows for 
convexity of the price-coupon relationship, but differs in that it 
incorporates this feature into a formal discount function 
framework. However, rather than attempting to model the market 
by taking a small number of investor types and assuming 
segmentation according to arepresentative investor for each type, 
as is done in this study, his main interest is to illustrate how 
segmentation occurs as a result of rational portfolio behaviour 
on the part of investors faced by different tax schedules. The 
basic assumptions of the Schaefer approach are, however, very 
similar to those adopted in this study, and are therefore discussed 
at length in other sections.
The reason why Schaefer introduces segmentation deserves 
separate mention. In a complete bond market with differential 
taxation, unless short and long positions are treated 
asymmetrically there is no equilibrium because of the possibility 
of unlimited tax arbitrage.1 For example, if n denotes the relative 
price of a cash flow subject to income tax in terms of a cash flow 
that is tax free, denotes the rate of income tax applicable to the 
i-th individual and I denotes the set of individuals, equilibrium 
requires:
Vi € 1:7t = (1-1/100).
Otherwise, two individuals with, say, rates %l and t 2 with > t 2, 
could trade with mutual advantage and to the detriment of the 
tax collector at any price n  e (jq, t^), where 7ij = (1  -  T/1 0 0 ).
1. At a practical level, a gilt-edged market maker, who can borrow gilts and thus sell short, 
would arbitrage between low and high coupon gUts were he not constrained by the cost of 
borrowing.
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3.6 A discount function model with taxation
3.6.1 One investor type case
Let a  and y be the rates of tax on income and capital gain 
applicable to a representative investor. Let n(p,b,a,y) be the 
vector of after-tax cash flows on a bond - assuming it is bought 
and held to maturity - given the pre-tax flows b, the price p, and 
the tax rates. In a discount function framework the price function 
for such a bond is implicitly defined by:
p = n'v.
In standard notation, the model equation is then of the form: 
p = p(v,b,a,y) + e.
Using net of tax cash flows presents a major difficulty, because 
the timing of the tax payments depends in practice on a number 
of circumstances, some of which are unknown. The most serious 
problem is probably the timing of tax payments relating to capital 
gains.1 Since most tax codes require the tax to be paid after the 
gains are realized, the bond holder is usually given considerable 
control over when he pays the tax. The holder of a bond may, 
for example, wish to realize his losses immediately in order to 
benefit from the tax reduction, but to defer the realization of 
capital gains. There exists therefore in this respect a "tax-timing 
option". The buy-and-hold assumption made here is clearly 
inappropriate, but difficult to avoid. This point is discussed 
further in chapter V.
1. The situation in the gilt market is relatively straightforward compared to the US bond 
markets, where a distinction has to be made between short and long-term capital gains.
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3.6.2 Several investor type case
The approach followed in this and the next chapter is to assume 
segmentation, whereby each bond is bought, and therefore 
priced, according to the type of investor that puts the highest 
value upon it. As already mentioned, this model requires that 
long and short positions are treated asymmetrically. The 
asymmetry is obtained here, as in the case of section 1.3.2, by 
assuming that short positions are not allowed.
The model would then be of the form: 
p = max({p(vi,b,oci,Yi) ,ie  I}) + e
where I is the set of investor types. In practice, in order to obtain 
a smooth and well-behaved function, a generalisation of this 
model is used, based on the following result.
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Lemma
Consider the finite set Z containing positive real numbers. Let 
7t(Z, r) be the power mean of Z of order r, i.e. in standard notation:
where K (Z) denotes the cardinality of Z. 
Then:
(i) min(Z) < n < max(Z)
(ii) > r2 => 7i(Z, rj) > 7t(Z, r2)
(iii) lim n(Z,r) = min(Z)
(iv) lim 7t(Z,r) = max(Z).
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The equation used for modelling the gilt market is of the form: 
P = Jt({p(Vi, b, ots, Yi), i 6  I}, r )+ e
where r is assumed to be constant over time, and is estimated to 
be very large (300-500) but finite.
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3.7 The gilt model
Let p be the (clean) price of a gilt, a be the accrued, t* be the time to
the next coupon date, c be the vector of before tax coupon payments, 
a  and y be the rates of tax, v be the discount function and t the time to 
redemption. Then, in standard notation, and neglecting for simplicity 
the case of partly paid stocks, 1 the price function for a representative 
investor is implicitly defined by:
p = (1  - a ) c 'v  + a a v ti+ p v t+ ( l  - y ) ( 1 0 0 - p )  vt- a
or equivalently by:
p = ( l - a ) c 'v - ( l - a v t>)a  + 1 0 0 ( 1  -y )v t+ y p v t.
So the price function for the representative investor is given by: 
p = { (1  - a ) c ' v - ( l - a v ti) a + 1 0 0 ( 1  - y )v t }/{l - y v t }.
In accordance with the description given of the tax regime of gilts it 
is assumed that the model may be built around three representative 
investors, one for each type of tax status: gross, net and net net.
The relative tax rates are respectively:
(i) <x, = 0 , y, = 0
(ii) (X2 = unknown, y2 = 0
(iii) (X3 = unknown, y3 = CC3.
1. In the case of a new issue, part of the issue price payment may be deferred, so that one 
or more negative cash flows must be included in the price function.
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By a change in notation, letting 0C2 = a  and 0 3  = y, one gets the final 
model equation:
P = n({Pi(b, v1),p2(b,a, v2),p3(b,y, v3)},r) + e
where p ^ .,.), p2(-» •> •)> P3C , •) denote the price functions for gross, net 
and net net representative investors respectively.
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3.8 Gilt yield surface
Allowing for taxation fundamentally affects the shape of a yield 
surface. This is illustrated by the following three graphs, describing 
yield surfaces for individual investor types generated by the same par 
yield curve under the ad hoc assumption that the curve lies on each 
surface.1 The three surfaces correspond, respectively, to the 
assumptions:
(i) o t j  = 0 , Y j  =  0
(ii) CX2 = 35%, y2 -  0
(iii) (X3 = 35%,Y3 = 35%.
Yield surface (i)
-14
12 -
10 -
2812 16 20 240 4 8
yield life (years) coupon
1. The actual estimated par yield curve for 1 September 1988 is used in these examples.
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The first graph provides an example of a pure duration effect. This is 
absent at the shortest maturity, and rises at longer maturities to a level 
which, despite the fact that the par yield curve is quite steep, is relatively 
modest.1
The subsequent two graphs show how tax effects can easily swamp 
duration effects. The graphs also illustrate how the nature of the effects 
is quite different under the two taxed regimes. Under the net regime 
the effect reaches its maximum at the shortest maturity, and decreases 
throughout maturities. Under a net net regime the effect is, as in the 
case of a pure duration effect, absent at the shortest maturity, and rises 
to a relatively modest level at the longer maturities. In this latter case 
the behaviour is due to the advantage capital gain enjoys compared to 
income, owing to the delay in payment of the tax. The existence of 
the tax-timing option should, therefore, be expected to reduce the effect 
at higher coupon levels, thus causing the slope of the surface in the 
direction of the coupon to flatten and possibly even, depending on the 
type of model assumed, to become negative.
Given the very different types of effect under different regimes, one 
might expect it to be easy to distinguish between them on empirical 
grounds. However, the simultaneous presence of a number of different 
regimes can complicate matters considerably.
1. A change in coupon of 1 % at long maturities corresponds to only about 4 basis points in 
yield. This is, however, much more than that observed in the case of the Dutch bullet market 
(see section 2.2.3).
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The yield surface corresponding to the UK gilt model is a composite 
surface approximately obtained by joining up the minima of the actual 
surfaces applicable to each investor type.1 Estimated individual 
investor type surfaces corresponding to the same three tax assumptions 
as before are illustrated in the following three graphs. Comparing these 
and the previous ones gives an idea of the magnitude of the bias that 
could derive from neglecting market segmentation.
Yield surface (i’)
yield life (years) coupon
1. These surfaces are different from the previous ones in that they are the actual estimated 
surfaces rather than the theoretical ones generated - under different ad hoc single investor 
type assumptions - by a given par yield curve.
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The graph below shows the estimated composite yield surface 
corresponding to the previous three. In this circumstance, it would 
appear that the longer maturities are dominated by gross investors, the 
low coupon gilts - especially at shorter maturities - are dominated by 
net investors, whereas the short to medium maturities and medium to 
high coupon gilts are dominated by net net investors. This is also 
generally true. More details regarding the segmentation are given in 
the next three chapters.
Yield surface
-14
12 -
10 -
24 280 4 8 12 16 20
yield life (years) coupon
It is worth pointing out at this stage how this situation gives rise to an 
indeterminacy problem: the discount function for net net investors is 
poorly determined at long maturities, as is the discount function for 
gross investors at short maturities, and possibly also the discount 
functions for net investors at the longest maturities. This issue is 
discussed further in section 6.2.
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IV. UK GILTS: EMPIRICAL RESULTS
4.1 Model estimation
The UK gilt market model was estimated using daily prices over 
1987-88. The data was obtained from Morgan Grenfell Government 
Securities, which at the time was a gilt-edged market maker. As 
explained in the introduction of chapter ID, only dated conventional 
gilts with no significant option element were included. Issues that were 
negligibly small (e.g. because they had been almost entirely converted) 
or exceptionally illiquid due to special circumstances (e.g. 3% 
Exchequer Gas 1990/95) were not used. Also, recently issued gilts 
were usually omitted for several days after issue.
The discount functions for each type of investor are specified in the 
same way as those used in the Bund and Dutch bullet models, but with 
a different choice of rates {rk} in order to maintain the number of 
parameters at a manageable level. The rates chosen are:
r1 = 3% 
r2 = 6% 
r3 = 12% 
r4 = 24%.
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The graph below shows the standard error of the gilt model over the 
two-year period covered.
S tandard  e rro r on gilt model
daily data 1987-88
U.06
0.54 -
0.52 -
0.5 -
0.48 -
0.46 -
0.44 -
0.42 -
0.4 -
0.38 -
0.36 -
0.34 -
0.32 -
0 .3 --------
02-Jan-87 30-Dec-8 815-Apr-87 30- Jul-87 10-Nov-87 24-Feb-8 8 19-Sep-88
The standard error averages just below 0.40, or around 12/32, over the 
period. This is a much worse fit than in the case of either the German 
Bund or the Dutch bullet model. There are several possible reasons 
for this. Firstly, the greater complexity of modelling a market with 
taxation effects and, in particular, the weaknesses inherent in 
calculations of net of tax cash flows. Secondly, a number of poorly 
traded gilts were included, and the gilt market doesn’t benefit from 
regulatory intervention as in the case of the German Bund market. 
Thirdly, no special allowance has been made for FOTRA gilts, which 
tend to trade at a premium. These points are examined in greater detail 
in later sections of this chapter and in chapter V.
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The estimation on data for 1 September 1988, which was fairly average 
for the period considered, gave the following results:
Table 8. Estimation on 1 September 1988
Gross segment:
Pj = -0.137 Si= 0.062 t1= -2 .2
P2 =  0.897 s2= 0.165 ta= 5.4
P 3 =  -0.171 s3 = 0.167 t3= - 1 .0
P4 =  0.412 s4 = 0.064 U= 6.4
Net segment:
p5 = -0.173 s5= 0.135 ts = -1.3
P6 =  1.298 s6= 0.290 t«= 4.5
P , =  -0.299 s7= 0.209 t7= -1.4
P » =  0.174 sg= 0.055 t«= 3.1
Net net segment:
Ps= -0.013 s9 = 0.125 t,=  -0 .1
P io =  0.957 s10= 0.255 tio= 3.7
p„ = 0 .0 1 2 s„ = 0.170 tn = 0 .1
TO N) II O O s12= 0.040 ti2= 1*1
R* = 0.998 SE= 0.44
observations = 85 degrees of freedom = 76
Note: model estimated under the constraints:
f  3 ^ f  1 \  (  11 ^P4 =  1 -  E  Pk , p8= 1 -  I  Pk and P12=  1 -  I  Pk
V k = l  )  V k = 5 )  \  k = 9 )
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The low values of the asymptotic t statistics on the coefficients of the 
net net segment of the market suggest that there could be problems 
with the model specification in this case. The result is consistent with 
the previous remarks regarding the timing option of tax on capital gains. 
This point is discussed in more detail in chapter V.
The graph below overlays coupon yield curves estimated on 1 
September 1988 with yields on the same date of gilts that were used 
in the estimation. The coupon effect is very clear, as is the 
segmentation. The table that follows provides the key to the graph.
UK gilt yield structure
on 1 September 1988
11.4
Note: see ft in table below fo r  key to individual bonds.
Coupon yield curves given correspond to 3%, 6%, 9%, 12% and 15%.
10.1
10.6 -
10.4 -
10.2 -
10 -
9.6 -
9.4 -
9.2 -
0 8 12 16 20 24 284
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Table 9. UK gilt list on 1 September 1988
# stock price yield
i 9.5 Tr 25-Oct-88 99.59 11.903
2 11.5 Tr 22-Feb-89 99-27 11.705
3 9.5 TC 18-Apr-89 98-24 11.597
4 3 Tr 15-May-89 
10.5 Tr 14-Jun-89
96-00 9.047
5 99-07 11.527
6 10 Ex 1-Aug-89 98-24 11.459
7
8
11 Ex 29-Sep-89 
5 Tr 15-Oct-86/89
99-22
94-24
11.345
10.051
9 /  13 Tr 15-Jan-90 102-18 10.860
10 /  11 Ex 12-Feb-90 100-06 10.809
11 12.5 Ex 22-Mar-90 102-07 10.951
12 3 Tr 8-May-90 
10 TC 25-Oct-90
90-20 9.152
13 98-12 10.849
14 2.5 Ex 22-Nov-90 87-12 8.885
15 11.75 Trl0-Jan-91 101-28 10.789
16 /  5.75 Fn 5-Apr-87/91 90-10 10.110
17 3 Tr 13-May-91 86-08 8.851
18 11 Ex 25-Oct-91 100-26 10.673
19 8 Tr 10-Dec-91 92-26 10.646
20 /  12.75 Tr 22-Jan-92 106-03 10.535
21 10Tr21-Feb-92 98-17 10.501
22 /  8Trl3-Apr-92 92-16 10.536
23 /  10.5 TC 7-Mav-92 
3 Tr 11-Jun-92
99-26 10.542
24 82-08 8.605
25 12.25 Ex 25-Aug-92 
13.5 Ex 22-Sep-92
8.25 Tr 18-Feb-93
105-07 10.593
26 109-08 10.632
27 92-03 10.498
28 /  10 Tr 15-Apr-93 
/  12.5 Tr 14-Jul-93
98-07 10.482
29 107-16 10.473
30 /  6 Fn 15-Sep-93 
/  13.75 Tr23-Nov-93
88-11 8.923
31 112-18 10.531
32 8.5 Tr 3-Feb-94 91-30 10.471
33 /  14.5 Tr l-Mar-94 116-12 10.504
34 13.5 Ex 27-Apr-94 111-30 10.618
35 /  10Tr9-Jun-94 98-10 10.382
36 12.5 Ex 22-Aug-94 
/  9 Tr 17-Nov-94
108-01 10.637
37 94-04 10.287
38 12 Tr 25-Jan-95 106-10 10.596
39 10.25 Ex 21-Jul-95 99-05 10.412
40 /  12.75 Tr 15-Nov-95 111-10 10.454
41 14 Tr 22-Jan-96 117-02 10.590
42 /  15.25 Tr 3-May-96 
/  13.25 Ex 15-May-96
124-06 10.549
43 114-14 10.455
44 10 Cv 15-Nov-96 97-30 10.362
45 /  13.25 Tr22-Jan-97 115-14 10.423
46 10.5 Ex 21-Feb-97 100-24 10.351
47 /  8.75 Tr 1-Sep-97 91-22 10.178
48 15 Ex 27-Oct-97 125-14 10.575
49 9.75 Ex 19-Jan-98 96-24 10.283
50 /  6.75 Tr 1-May-95/98 81-14 9.751
51 14 Tr 22- May-98/01 120-23 10.525
52 /  15.5 Tr 30-Sep-98 130-29 10.463
53 12 Ex 20-Nov-98 109-30 10.380
54 /  9.5 Tr 15-Jan-99 96-10 10.067
55 12 Ex 22-Jan-99/02 109-30 10.396
56 12.25 Ex 26-Mar-99 111-30 10.365
57 10.5 Tr 19-May-99 
10.25 Cv 22-Nov-99
101-16 10.252
58 99-31 10.240
59 /  8.5 Tr 28-Jan-00 89-28 9.996
60 /  9 Cv 3-Mar-00 93-04 10.017
61 13 Tr 14-Jul-00 117-25 10.347
62 13.75 Tr 25-Jul-00/03 122-18 10.386
63 10 Tr 26-Feb-01 99-09 10.090
64 11.5 Tr 19-Mar-01/04 109-06 10.185
65 9.75 Cv lO-Aug-01 
10 Cv 11-Apr-02
9.75 Tr 27-Aug-02 
9 Ex 19-Nov-02
97-25 10.049
66 99-28 10.007
67 98-06 9.984
68 93-00 9.916
69 11.75 Tr 22-Jan-03/07 113-08 9.980
70 10 Tr 8-Sep-03 100-21 9.911
71 12.5 Tr 21-Nov-03/05 119-11 9.985
72 13.5 Tr 26-Mar-04/08 127-23 9.958
73 10 Tr 18-May-04 
3.5 Fn 14-Jul-99/04
101-02 9.852
74 56-27 8.499
75 9.5 Cv 25-Oct-04 97-22 9.777
76 9.5 Cv 18-Apr-05
10.5 Ex 20-Sep-05
97-31 9.739
77 106-09 9.734
78 9.75 Cv 15-Nov-06 100-15 9.682
79 /  8.5 Tr 16-Jul-07 91-02 9.519
80 /  9Trl3-Oct-08 95-17 9.492
81 8 Tr 25-Sep-09 
/  9 Cv 12-Jul-ll
86-24 9.459
82 96-04 9.405
83 /  5.5 Tr 10-Sep-08/12 64-13 9.197
84 12 Ex 12-Dec-13/17 124-13 9.436
85 /  7.75 Tr 26-Jan-12/15 84-10 9.353
Note: /  denotes FOTRA gilts.
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4.2 Effective tax rates and the 1988 budget
An important test of the gilt model is the comparison of the "effective 
tax rates", i.e. the rates of tax that provide the best fit of the model, 
with the rates of tax that are known a priori to apply to the different 
categories of investors. The table below summarizes the results 
obtained over the period from October 1987 to June 1988, which for 
reasons described later is particularly interesting.
Table 10. Average standard error of the gilt model 
October 1987 -  June 1988
p ro fits  
ta x  ra te
20 25 30 35
in com e tax  rate  
40 45 50 55 60 65 70
10 0.703 0.58 0.531 0.533 0.569 0.589 0.618 0.65 0.692 0.751 0.815
15 0.686 0.549 0.498 0.514 0.53 0.546 0.568 0.597 0.644 0.704 0.763
20 0.668 0.536 0.481 0.483 0.481 0.489 0.513 0.551 0.602 0.654 0.708
25 0.663 0.523 0.464 0.446 0.438 0.448 0.476 0.52 0.576 0.64 0.69
30 0.666 0.523 0.456 0.427 0.416 0.427 0.457 0.502 0.555 0.619 0.669
35 0.677 0.544 0.451 0.413 0.4 0.411 0.441 0.484 0.54 0.598 0.643
40 0.708 0.574 0.477 0.411 0.398 0.41 0.44 0.479 0.525 0.581 0.631
45 0.732 0.623 0.516 0.446 0.407 0.418 0.447 0.484 0.525 0.573 0.609
50 0.736 0.662 0.596 0.502 0.46 0.437 0.46 0.496 0.538 0.575 0.601
It is apparent that the minimum average standard error over the period 
considered is achieved for an income tax rate of around 40% and a 
corporation tax rate of 35-40%. The rate of corporation tax used in 
the model estimation over the whole of 1987-88 was fixed at 35%, in 
view of the fact that this was the top rate of corporation tax during that 
period.
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In his 1988/89 Budget speech1 the Chancellor announced that the top 
rate of income tax was to be reduced from 60% to 40%. A reduction 
was generally expected, but not of such a magnitude. Expectation of 
a cut in the top rate had built up over a period of months as information 
emerged regarding to the state of public finances and government 
intentions. A landmark in this process was the previous Autumn 
Statement.2 An interesting test of the gilt model is whether this process 
of expectation formation is reflected in the effective rates of tax. The 
following table shows very clearly the correct type of response on the 
part of the model to the tax changes.
Table 11. Average standard error of the gilt model
October 1987 - June 1988
trad e
d ates
20 25 30 35
in com e tax ra tes3 
40 45 50 55 60 65 70
1987Q4
1988Q1
1988Q2
0.748
0.654
0.629
0.620
0.518
0.493
0.476
0.442
0.433
0.431
0.405
0.402
0.410 0.410 0.429 0.465 
0.390 0.403 0.438 0.480 
0.398 0.419 0.455 0.505
0.534
0.532
0.555
0.577
0.590
0.628
0.617
0.635
0.676
The table shows how the rate of income tax implied by the model 
declines from 40-45% in the autumn of 1987 to 35-40% in the spring 
of 1988. Similar calculations in 1986 give an effective rate of income 
tax of 45-50%. In view of this, it was decided to use a rate of income 
tax of 45% in the model estimation up to the budget, and a rate of 35% 
thereafter.
1. This took place on 15 March 1988.
2. This was delivered on 3 November 1987.
3. The profits tax rate is fixed at 35%.
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4.3 Error analysis
The following model, subject to different sets of restrictions, was fitted 
to the time series of estimated errors:
et,i = m+Pi(e,_M-ni)+$u
„ „ fO if t ^ t ,  or i i ^ i ,
E i ^ O . E ^ , ^  '
[o otherwise
= 0, E^P^ = 0, E ^ , . ,^  = 0 
E ^ n v E f e . - n ^ - i V ^
Epi = mp,E(Pii- m9) (P ,-m ,)  = {^
E(^i,-m)1)(Pi2-iiip) = 0.
The estimation, carried out across 91 gilts using daily data for 1987-88, 
produced:
Table 12. Results of erro r model estimation
model riv a . mp
A
a df
A Of Of Of Of 0.40 40569
B Of Of 0.93 0.07 0.10 40478
C -0.04 0.34 Of Of 0.22 40478
D -0.04 0.34 0.84 0.09 0.10 40387
E Of Of If Of 0.10 40569
F Of Of 0.97 f Of 0.10 40568
G -0.04 0.34 0.9 Of 0.10 40477
Note: a f  indicates a constrained parameter in the estimation.
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The main fact that emerges from this table is that the errors appear to 
be strongly auto-correlated, to the point that they closely resemble a 
random walk.
As discussed in section 1.4, one would not expect pricing errors to fall 
outside a band of width comparable to twice the bid-offer spread except 
in so far as the model failed to capture all the factors affecting investors ’ 
judgement of value. If the neglected factors usually changed slowly, 
errors in price should vary within a band around some slowly changing 
level (long-term mispricing). In this case arbitrage profits would not 
be possible even if long-term mispricing tended to revert towards zero, 
owing to the costs of running a long term position. The following 
tables illustrate how, by using a simple rule of thumb,1 it was possible 
in 1988 to make a return that would just about equal transaction costs 
over a holding period of 30 working days.
Table 13. Example of portfolio simulation 
4 January 1988
stock nominal
amount
price 
04-Jan 05-Jan 11-Jan
price change by:
18-Jan 25-Jan 01-Feb 08-Feb 15-Feb
/  6.75 Tr l-May-95/98 7 83.13 -0.38 -0.81 -0.06 1.19 1.38 0.13 0.44
12 Ex 12-Dec-13/17 9 124.38 -0.31 -1.56 0.44 ZOO 1.94 -0.19 0.56
13.75 Tr25-Jul-00/03 11 126.75 -0.38 -1.56 0.13 1.63 1.50 -0.38 0.06
13 Tr 14-Jul-00 10 121.75 -0.38 -1.50 0.19 1.63 1.56 -0.38 0.06
14 Tr 22-May-98/01 10 125.50 -0.38 -1.56 -0.31 1.19 1.19 -0.75 -0.38
/  8.5 Tr 16-Jul-07 -9 92.06 -0.25 -1.25 0.44 1.44 1.38 -0.31 0.44
/  13.75 Tr23-Nov-93 -10 118.56 -0.25 -1.19 -0.81 0.44 0.19 -1.19 -1.19
9 Ex 19-Nov-02 -11 95.50 -0.38 -1.13 0.31 1.50 1.31 -0.50 0.19
/  9.5 Tr 15-Jan-99 -11 99.31 -0.38 -1.31 0.00 1.13 1.13 -0.50 0.06
/  14.5 Tr l-Mar-94 -10 122.72 -0.25 -1.28 -0.59 0.59 0.41 -1.09 -1.16
portfolio gain: -0.01 -0.03 0.10 0.19 0.25 0.21 0.23
Note: /  denotes FOTRA gilts.
1. The rule adopted is:
- portfolio duration, running yield and money invested are all constrained to zero
- total transaction nominal is 100
- the 5 most cheap bonds are bought and the 5 most dear bonds are sold in amounts 
as equal as possible (in a least squares sense) given the above constraints. Cheapness 
and dearness are defined by (mispricing - average) /  standard deviation, with the 
statistics calculated over the previous six months.
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Table 14. Summary portfolio simulation returns 
daily data 1988
trade
date
1 5
gain after days: 
10 15 20 25 30
04-Jan-88 -0.01 -0.03 0.10 0.19 0.25 0.21 0.23
05-Jan-88 0.04 0.01 0.05 0.06 0.13 0.09 0.11
06-Jan-88 -0.07 0.00 0.02 0.07 0.18 0.20 0.20
07-Jan-88 -0.01 0.01 0.14 0.19 0.25 0.26 0.33
08-Jan-88 0.04 0.06 0.16 0.21 0.22 0.24 0.30
1 1-Jan-88 0.03 0.13 0.17 0.22 0.24 0.25 0.39
12-Jan-88 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.21 0.18 0.21 0.29
13-Jan-88 -0.02 0.02 0.07 0.14 0.17 0.16 0.28
14-Jan-88 0.02 0.12 0.16 0.24 0.24 0.32 0.43
15-Jan-88 0.30 0.31 0.38 0.41 0.41 0.43 0.56
18-Jan-88 -0.05 0.02 0.07 0.10 0.12 0.23 0.27
19-Jan-88 0.01 0.05 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.21 0.24
20-Jan-88 0.02 0.04 0.18 0.19 0.17 0.26 0.25
21-Jan-88 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.07 0.11 0.17 0.19
22-Jan-88 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.07 0.16 0.28 0.21
25-Jan-88 -0.04 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.29 0.34 0.30
26-Jan-88 0.02 0.15 0.12 0.16 0.29 0.30 0.36
27-Jan-88 0.16 0.25 0.24 0.28 0.38 0.38 0.41
28-Jan-88 0.07 0.11 0.10 0.19 0.25 0.27 0.36
29-Jan-88 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.21 0.36 0.25 0.49
Ol-Feb-88 0.06 -0.10 0.00 0.34 0.39 0.36 0.60
02-Feb-88 0.01 -0.05 0.03 0.19 0.20 0.29 0.34
03-Feb-88 -0.03 0.00 0.05 0.20 0.14 0.22 0.21
04-Feb-88 0.01 0.05 0.16 0.21 0.28 0.37 0.20
05-Feb-88 -0.06 0.00 0.12 0.19 0.17 0.29 0.13
08-Feb-88 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.14 0.15 0.22 0.10
09-Feb-88 0.15 0.13 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.28 0.21
10-Feb-88 -0.02 0.00 0.09 0.03 0.08 0.13 0.05
11-Feb-88 0.02 0.04 0.10 0.11 0.21 0.09 0.06
12-Feb-88 -0.03 0.05 0.14 0.08 0.18 0.07 0.04
15-Feb-88 0.02 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.22 0.10 0.13
17-Feb-88 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.19 0.09 0.06
18-Feb-88 0.04 0.11 0.06 0.11 0.15 0.05 0.16
16-Nov-88 0.00 o!o3 o!o3 0.01 6.00 -0.01 -o!o2
17-Nov-88 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.01
18-Nov-88 0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.06 -0.05 -0.02 0.02
21-Nov-88 0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 -0.03
22-Nov-88 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 0.02
23-Nov-88 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.06 -0.05 0.00
24-Nov-88 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.03
25-Nov-88 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.05
28-Nov-88 0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 -0.01
29-Nov-88 0.00 -0.03 -0.04 -0.08 -0.05 -0.01 -0.04
30-Nov-88 0.00 -0.03 -0.05 -0.08 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04
01-Dec-88 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 -0.07
02-Dec-88 -0.01 -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.07
05-Dec-88 0.02 0.01 -0.03 0.00 0.03 0.01 -0.06
06-Dec-88 -0.01 -0.02 -0.06 -0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.09
07-Dec-88 0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 -0.06
08-Dec-88 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 -0.01 -0.06 -0.10
09-Dec-88 0.01 -0.06 -0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.05 -0.08
12-Dec-88 -0.01 -0.05 -0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.06 -0.05
13-Dec-88 -0.02 -0.04 0.00 0.04 0.01 -0.06 -0.06
14-Dec-88 0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02 -0.03 -0.02
15-Dec-88 -0.06 -0.02 0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.05 -0.02
16-Dec-88 0.02 0.04 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.08 0.12
19-Dec-88 0.00 0.05 0.09 0.07 0.04 0.08 0.12
20-Dec-88 0.01 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.14
21-Dec-88 -0.01 0.05 0.08 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.09
22-Dec-88 0.01 0.07 0.10 0.12 0.07 0.10 0.09
23-Dec-88 0.04 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.08
28-Dec-88 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.03
29-Dec-88 -0.01 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.04 -0.01
30-Dec-88 0.02 0.03 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.05 -0.03
average: 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08
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Despite the relatively high standard error of the gilt model, it therefore 
appears that arbitrage profits net of costs might be extremely small. 
Thus the size of the standard error is likely to be in part a reflection of 
the inability of the model to capture all the complexities of the gilt 
market rather than a case of inefficient behaviour. One factor that 
might help to explain the size of the standard error is the FOTRA effect, 
which is discussed in the following section.
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4.4 The FOTRA effect
It is common belief of gilt market participants that FOTRA stocks 
should enjoy a premium in view of their privileged tax treatment. A 
priori, such a premium should be small, since an overseas investor can 
wash the coupon when necessary on non-FOTRA stocks at an average 
cost that is almost negligible in view of the fact that the expected 
holding period is usually quite short. To be more precise, an overseas 
investor who planned to have a stable holding of gilts would have 
transaction costs on non-FOTRA gilts of about twice1 the bid-offer 
spread each year, which on a 10 year gilt would be equivalent to about 
1 % in price terms. One would expect the FOTRA effect to be less than 
that. The graph and table that follow provide some empirical evidence 
on this subject.
Mean error of FOTRAs vs. duration
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1. Since gilts pay coupons semi-annually, two washes a year would be required.
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Table 15. Mispricing of FOTRA gilts 
daily data 1987-88
# stock average
d u ra tion
m isp r ic in g  sta tis tics  
m ea n  std  d ev  std  var
1 13 Tr 15-Jan-90 1.82 0.08 0.14 0.16
2 11 Ex 12-Feb-90 1.83 -0.05 0.14 0.15
3 12.75 Tr22-Jan-92 3.30 0.29 0.11 0.31
4 10.5 TC 7-May-92 3.51 0.03 0.11 0.11
5 10 Tr 15-Apr-93 4.10 0.05 0.16 0.16
6 12.5 Tr 14-Jul-93 4.19 0.25 0.12 0.27
7 14.5 Tr 1-Mar-94 4.23 0.67 0.13 0.68
8 13.75 Tr23-Nov-93 4.25 0.26 0.15 0.30
9 6 Fn 15-Sep-93 4.71 1.43 0.58 1.55
10 9 Tr 17-Nov-94 5.12 0.21 0.25 0.33
11 15.25 Tr3-M ay-96 5.22 0.27 0.15 0.31
12 12.75 Tr 15-Nov-95 5.24 0.18 0.13 0.22
13 13.25 Ex 15-May-96 5.41 0.25 0.11 0.27
14 13.25 Tr22-Jan-97 5.80 0.18 0.13 0.22
15 15.5 Tr 30-Sep-98 5.99 -0.01 0.29 0.29
16 8.75 Tr 1-Sep-97 6.33 -0.19 0.27 0.33
17 9.5 Tr 15-Jan-99 6.97 0.53 0.14 0.54
18 9 Cv 3-Mar-00 7.19 0.50 0.15 0.52
19 8.5 Tr 16-M -07 9.37 0.41 0.15 0.44
20 7.75 Tr 26-Jan-12/15 10.52 -0.34 0.28 0.44
21 5.5 Tr 10-Sep-08/12 10.76 0.09 0.55 0.56
FOTRA average 5.52* 0.24*
0.43* 0.24* 0.49*
non-FOTRA average 5.38* -0.10*
0.25* 0.16* 0.30*
total average 5.42* 0.01*
0.32* 0.19* 0.37*
Note: $ = arithmetical mean, f  = root mean square.
There are a number of facts that emerge from the analysis above. 
Firstly, the average mispricing of FOTRA relative to non-FOTRA gilts 
is around 1/3, i.e. over 3 times the average bid-offer spread, but is well 
within the levels one would expect a priori. Secondly, the effect doesn’t 
appear to be increasing in duration, as one might expect;1 this is 
probably due to the fact that foreign investors buy selectively, and that 
therefore the FOTRA effect is a function of stock and of foreign
1. The regression of average mispricing against duration produces a negative (and 
insignificant) coefficient and a highly significant constant
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investor interest. Thirdly, a crude calculation1 suggests that 
eliminating the FOTRA effect would lead to a standard error 
comparable to that recorded on Bund, so that the relatively poor 
performance of the gilt model is probably due to the FOTRA effect; 
unfortunately, it is almost impossible within a discount function 
framework to take the FOTRA effect into account in a way that isn’t 
either highly contrived or much too parameterized to be feasible, and 
this has not therefore been attempted.2 Fourthly, the FOTRA effect 
appears to be relatively volatile, since the standard deviation of FOTRA 
gilt errors is 50% higher than that of non-FOTRA gilts.
1. Bearing in mind that there are 21 FOTRA gilts with average standard error of 0.49, and 
45 non-FOTRA gilts with average standard 0.30, by solving for x the system:
121 • 0.492= 21 • x2+ f  
[45 • 0.302=45 • x2+ f
one gets a guess at the net of FOTRA standard error of 0.21.
2. It is worth pointing out that the FOTRA effect, while large compared to the model standard 
error, is small when compared to the standard errors of other comparable models in the 
literature.
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4.5 Heteroscedasticity & the bid-offer spread
It has been argued in the literature, on somewhat flimsy grounds, that 
errors are homoscedastic in yield terms. As explained in section 1.4, 
a rather more convincing argument is that the error variances might 
depend on the bid-offer spread. A statistical investigation of this fact 
is difficult because reliable data on bid-offer spreads is not available, 
and because the spreads vary over time and from market maker to 
market maker. The data reported in the table on the next page are only 
broadly indicative.
Error standard deviation vs duration
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Table 16. Mispricing and bid-offer spread 
daily data 1987-88
# stock average
d u ration
b id -o ffer
sp read
stan d ard
d ev ia tion
1 11.5 Tr 22-Feb-89 1.014 0.03125 0.110
2 9.5 TC 18-Apr-89 1.183 0.06250 0.124
3 3 Tr 15-May-89 1.328 0.18750 0.248
4 10.5 Tr 14-Jun-89 1.330 0.03125 0.123
5 10 Ex l-Aug-89 1.466 0.03125 0.124
6 11 Ex 29-Sep-89 1.547 0.03125 0.142
7 /  13 Tr 15-Jan-90 1.818 0.06250 0.137
8 /  11 Ex 12-Feb-90 1.826 0.06250 0.139
9 12.5 Ex 22-Mar-90 1.903 0.06250 0.104
10 3 Tr 8-May-90 2.253 0.25000 0.208
11 10 TC 25-Oct-90 2.435 0.06250 0.118
12 11.75 TrlO-Jan-91 2.602 0.06250 0.094
13 2.5 Ex 22-Nov-90 2.775 0.37500 0.346
14 11 Ex 25-Oct-91 3.122 0.06250 0.139
15 3 Tr 13-May-91 3.174 0.37500 0.359
16 /  12.75 Tr22-Jan-92 3.302 0.06250 0.113
17 10 Tr 21-Feb-92 3.326 0.06250 0.108
18 /  10.5 TC 7-May-92 3.511 0.06250 0.112
19 12.25 Ex 25-Aug-92 3.534 0.06250 0.120
20 13.5 Ex 22-Sep-92 3.550 0.06250 0.119
21 /  10 Tr 15-Apr-93 4.103 0.06250 0.158
22 /  12.5 Tr 14-Jul-93 4.194 0.06250 0.118
23 /  14.5 Tr 1-Mar-94 4.233 0.12500 0.134
24 /  13.75 Tr23-Nov-93 4.252 0.06250 0.148
25 13.5 Ex 27-Apr-94 4.443 0.06250 0.110
26 12.5 Ex 22-Aug-94 4.573 0.06250 0.123
27 /  6 Fn 15-Sep-93 4.706 0.37500 0.580
28 12 Tr 25-Jan-95 5.038 0.06250 0.139
29 /  9 Tr 17-Nov-94 5.120 0.06250 0.251
30 /  15.25 Tr3-M ay-96 5.223 0.06250 0.151
31 /  12.75 Tr 15-Nov-95 5.243 0.06250 0.130
32 14 Tr22-Jan-96 5.325 0.09375 0.107
33 /  13.25 Ex 15-May-96 5.413 0.09375 0.114
34 10.25 Ex 21-Jul-95 5.421 0.06250 0.143
35 15 Ex 27-Oct-97 5.762 0.09375 0.129
36 /  13.25 Tr22-Jan-97 5.795 0.09375 0.133
37 10.5 Ex 21-Feb-97 5.850 0.09375 0.109
38 10 Cv 15-Nov-96 5.940 0.09375 0.114
39 /  15.5 Tr30-Sep-98 5.986 0.09375 0.289
40 /  8.75 Tr l-Sep-97 6.329 0.09375 0.274
41 12.25 Ex 26-Mar-99 6.447 0.09375 0.093
42 12E x20-N ov-98 6.464 0.09375 0.083
43 9.75 Ex 19-Jan-98 6.557 0.09375 0.096
44 10.5 Tr 19-May-99 6.821 0.09375 0.110
45 13 Tr 14-Jul-00 6.963 0.09375 0.113
46 /  9.5 Tr 15-Jan-99 6.974 0.09375 0.143
47 10.25 Cv 22-Nov-99 7.021 0.09375 0.120
48 /  9 Cv 3-Mar-00 7.191 0.09375 0.147
49 10Tr26-Feb-01 7.284 0.12500 0.130
50 9.75 Cv 10- Aug-01 7.417 0.12500 0.129
51 13.5 Tr 26-Mar-04/08 7.670 0.09375 0.212
52 10 Cv ll-A pr-02 7.682 0.12500 0.109
53 9.75 Tr 27-Aug-02 7.730 0.09375 0.154
54 12.5 Tr 21 -Nov-03/05 7.810 0.09375 0.214
55 11.75 Tr 22-Jan-03/07 7.848 0.09375 0.199
56 10Tr8-Sep-03 7.960 0.12500 0.139
57 lOTr 18-May-04 8.277 0.15625 0.091
58 10.5 Ex 20-Sep-05 8.351 0.15625 0.091
59 9.5 Cv 25-Oct-04 8.416 0.15625 0.094
60 9.5 Cv 18-Apr-05 8.503 0.15625 0.079
61 9.75 Cv 15-Nov-06 8.819 0.18750 0.125
62 /  8.5 Tr 16-Jul-07 9.369 0.15625 0.153
63 8 Tr 25-Sep-09 9.578 0.15625 0.174
64 12 Ex 12-Dec-13/17 9.618 0.18750 0.413
65 /  7.75 Tr26-Jan-12/15 10.525 0.25000 0.282
66 /  5.5 Tr 10-Sep-08/12 10.756 0.18750 0.554
Note: /  denotes FOTRA gilts.
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Regressing the standard error on a constant, duration and bid-offer 
spread one gets the following results:
Table 17. Regression results
model constant duration bid-offer
spread
A 0.01(2.9) -0 .0 0  (-0.0) 0.87(6.9)
B 0.13(4.5) 0.01(1.4) ot
Note: t-ratios in round brackets, f  = constrained parameter.
This data supports the argument of section 1.4, with the error standard 
deviation depending on a constant and on the bid-offer spread of the 
gilt in question, and not on duration.
It is worth pointing out that accounting for the standard deviation of 
errors doesn’t make much difference to the results. The following table 
compares estimates of the gilt model under homoscedasticity and 
heteroscedasticity according to the historical standard deviations. The 
test statistics show that the heteroscedastic estimates are not 
significantly different form the homoscedastic ones.
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Table 18. Gilt model estimation with heteroscedasticity 
on 1 September 1988
homoscedastic
estimate
heteroscedastic
estimate
t-ratio
Gross segment:
p!= -0.137 p!= -0.149 t1= -0.2
P2= 0.897 p2= 0.933 t2 = 0.2
&3= -0.171 Pa= -0.216 t3= -0.3
P4= 0.412 P4= 0.431 t4= 0.3
Net segment:
p5= -0.173 P5= -0.053 ts= 0.9
P6 =  1.298 P „ =  1.049 t6= -0.9
p7= -0.299 P,= -0.141 t7= 0.8
Ps= 0.174 p8= 0.146 t8= -0.5
Net net segment:
P,= -0.013 p,= -0.029 t> = -0.1
P ,o =  0.957 P io =  0.985 tio= 0.1
pu = 0.012 p„ = -0.000 til = -0.1
II o g pi2= 0.045 tl2 = 0.0
Overall: 9^,76 = 0.7
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4.6 Conclusions
Statistical and anecdotal evidence that the gilt market is characterized 
by taxation effects and segmentation appears to be supported by 
econometric evidence. Chosing a representative investor for each of 
three major grouping, and assuming segmented net of tax discount 
functions, provides a sensible representation of these features. The 
main theoretical weakness of this methodology is the buy-and-hold 
assumption used for calculating net of tax cash flows. This issue is 
discussed in the next chapter.
At a more specific level, the FOTRA effect is a major problem with 
the gilt model, but is of little general interest and not really amenable 
to modelling, so no attempt has been made formally to account for it. 
If the FOTRA effect were eliminated, it would appear that the standard 
error on gilts might be about twice the bid-offer spread, which is the 
average trading cost of a round-trip in and out of a gilt.
On a more general note, the theoretical advantages of modelling bond 
markets in the price space are confirmed by the relationship that 
emerges between error standard deviations and bid-offer spread, which 
allows rejection of the homoscedasticity in yield theory. Accounting 
for heteroscedasticity does not, however, produce significantly 
different estimates.
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V. UK GILTS: THE TAX-TIMING OPTION
5.1 Introduction
As already discussed in previous sections, one of the most important 
theoretical difficulties with net of tax discount function models of bond 
markets relates to the timing of tax payments on capital gains. In the 
case of the gilt market, capital gains are usually subject only to 
corporation tax. The tax-timing option can therefore apply only to the 
net net segment of the market. Within this segment the bond holder 
who has not already managed to avoid all tax liability1 will, neglecting 
transaction costs,2 optimally realize a capital loss immediately,3 and 
has an incentive to lock in any capital gain.
If a tax-timing option is allowed for, the precise shape of the price 
surface within the net net segment depends on much stronger 
assumptions regarding the underlying economy in general and investor 
behaviour in particular than is required by a buy-and-hold discount 
function model. In view of this, no attempt is made here to provide a 
formal model of the tax-timing option.4 Instead, empirical evidence 
is sought regarding certain general implications of the tax-timing 
option approach.
1. A discussion of strategies whereby capital losses may be used to defer taxation indefinitely 
is contained in Constantinides and Scholes [17]. There are a number of legal and practical 
constraints to the use of these strategies in die UK which ensure that investors are seldom 
able to escape being taxed altogether.
2. As explained in a later section, the value of the tax-timing option under plausible 
assumptions is substantial, and accounting for transaction costs would not significantiy 
modify the conclusions of this chapter.
3. This type of consideration leads to the practice known as "bed and breakfasting", i.e. the 
sale and immediate re-purchase of a security. Dealers usually quote half or two thirds of 
the bid-offer spread on the round trip for this type of transaction.
4. Such a model is described in Constantinides and Ingersoll [16]. See section 1.2.3 for 
further references.
-101-
One robust implication of the tax-timing option is that the price surface 
within the net net segment must be convex with respect to the coupon, 
rather than linear. 1 In fact, given three gilts with the same maturity 
but different coupons, the cash flows corresponding to the one with 
intermediate coupon can be exactly replicated by a portfolio of the 
other two subject to the additional constraint that the tax-timing options 
be exercised simultaneously, i.e. that the portfolio be sold (or 
redeemed) in one block. If such a constraint existed, the surface would 
be linear, whereas the absence of such a constraint implies stochastic 
dominance of the intermediate stock by the portfolio, and so the surface 
must be convex.2 Unfortunately, this is analogous to the effect of 
segmentation, and may not always be distinguishable empirically from 
the latter.
Another fairly robust implication of the tax-timing option is that the 
slope of the price surface with respect to coupon must be steeper than 
would otherwise be predicted. This is due to the fact that, broadly 
speaking, the value of the option should increase with the likelihood 
of capital losses.
1. This fact is also exploited in Litzenberger and Rolfo [32] who, however, draw almost 
opposite conclusions by examining triplets of government bonds with same maturity date 
and different coupons.
2. This is analogous to the well known result that a portfolio of options on individual assets 
is worth more than an option on the portfolio of assets.
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5.2 Segmentation
The table below provides a summary description of the pattern of gilt 
market segmentation in 1988. The calculations are based on theoretical 
bonds priced according to the estimated segmented discount function 
model. At any given time a bond is classified as belonging to a 
particular segment if the corresponding investor type provides the 
highest price. The table is then compiled from the frequency 
distribution obtained by recalculating the segmentation daily.
Table 19. Pattern of segmentation 
daily data 1988
2-4 4-6 6-8
coupon
8-10 10-12 12-14 14-16
life
0-4 n n n m m m m
4-8 n n n m m m m
8-12 n n n m m m
12-16 n n g g g
16-20 n n g g g g
20-24 n g g g g g
24-28 g g g g g
Note: n = 75% of the time net, g = 15% of the time gross, m = 75% of the time 
net net.
A clearly defined pattern emerges from this table, with the short 
maturity medium to high coupon sector obviously dominated by net 
net investors. The next section attempts to provide some indication as 
to the extent of the effects one might expect to occur in the net net 
segment due to the tax-timing option.
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5.3 The option value
The following table contains the results of a Monte-Carlo simulation 
aimed at providing a crude indication1 as to the order of magnitude of 
the tax-timing option. The figures given are the average net present 
value2 of the difference between the capital gains tax payments under 
the buy-and-hold assumption, and the simulated capital gains tax 
payments assuming realization of available losses once a year.3
Simulated future prices used to obtain these results are generated by 
the model:4
|P t = Pt-1  + (100 -  pt.  !)/(T - 1) + [d q(yt, bJ/OyJ e,
[Ee,=0,Eef=  1
where t is now, and T is time of maturity, both measured in years.
In the table, areas of the yield surface that did not contain gilts 
belonging to the net net segment are denoted by n/a. The values 
obtained are roughly consistent with those reported, under somewhat 
different conditions, in Constantinides and Ingersoll [16].
1. A deliberate attempt is made to obtain a conservative estimate, so as to bias the results 
against the conclusions.
2. The discounting rate used is 10%, broadly in line with the gross yields prevailing at the 
time.
3. This ensures that the benefits of the strategy are not swamped by trading costs. Clearly, 
one may do better by trading more or less frequently. See the discussion in Constantinides 
and Ingersoll [16].
4. This is inconsistent with a discount function model, but is probably good enough for the 
purpose.
5. The assumed standard deviation of yield shocks of 1% per annum is relatively low by 
historical comparison.
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Table 20. Value of the tax-timing option 
simulation on average 1988 data
2 H 4 4 H 6 6 H 8
coupon
8 H 10 10 H 12 12 H 14 14 H  16
life
0 H 4 n/a n/a n/a 0.01 0.03 0.09 n/a
4 H 8 n/a n/a n/a 0.25 0.48 0.87 1.31
8 —112 n/a n/a n/a 0.82 1.21 1.99 2.76
12 H 16 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
16H 20 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
20 H  24 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
24H 28 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
OH 12 n/a n/a n/a 0.28 0.42 0.84 1.62
For comparative purposes, the next table gives the value of the option 
to amortize linearly the capital loss, which corresponds to the optimal 
strategy for the simulation model if yield volatility were set to zero. 
As one would expect, the intrinsic value increases with coupon and 
maturity, whereas the time value decreases.
Table 21. Intrinsic value of the tax-timing option 
based on average 1988 data
2 H 4 4 H 6 6 H 8
coupon 
8 H 10 10 H 12 12 H 14 14 H 16
life 
0 H 4 n/a n/a n/a 0.00 0.03 0.09 n/a
4 H 8 n/a n/a n/a 0.00 0.33 0.82 1.29
8 H 12 n/a n/a n/a 0.00 0.63 1.63 2.57
12 H 16 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
16 H 20 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
20 H 24 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
24 H 28 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
OH 12 n/a n/a n/a 0.00 0.25 0.80 1.59
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5.4 Empirical results
The following table makes it possible broadly to match the pattern of 
segmentation and predicted tax-timing option effect with that of 
average model mispricings.
Table 22. Pattern of mean errors 
daily data 1988
coupon
2 H 4 4 H 6 6 H 8 8 H 10 10 H 12 12 H 14 14 H 16
life
0 H 4 -0.04f0.i5; -0.16(025 ) -0.68(025)  -0.11(0 .15) -0 .09(0 .13) 0.08 (0 .17) n/a
4 H 8 -0.89(0 .35) 1.53(035 ) -0.43(0 .35) -0.09(0 .15) -0.23(022) 0.09 (0 .12) 0.56(025 )
8 —112 n/a n/a -0 .65(0 .35) 0.06(0 .14) -0.24(0 .16)  -O.19f0.i5/ -O.O4f0.22/
12 H 16 0.00(035 ) n/a n/a 0.13 (0 .13) 0.05(025 ) -0.29 (0 .18) n/a
16 H 20 -0.47(0 .35) n/a n/a 0.07(0 .16) 0.09(035 ) 0.17(035 ) n/a
20 H 24 n/a 0.24(035 ) 0.15/0J5/ 0.16(025 ) n/a n/a n/a
24 H 28 n/a 0.35(035 ) -0.48(0 .35) n/a -O.61f0.J5/ n/a n/a
OH 12 -0.04( 0.09) -O.16f0.09/ O.Olf0.09/ O.21f0.J7/
Note: the estimate of the standard deviation of the mean for each class is given in 
round brackets. The estimates are based on the assumption that the errors can be 
described by the model:
If in this case the tax-timing option approach provided a valid 
description of investor behaviour one would expect the mean error to 
be positive in the region with 14 H 16% coupon and 0 H 12 year life.
E ^  = 0
0 if tx *  tj or ix *  i2 
o2 otherwise
[0 if i ^ i 2 
h 1 a? otherwise.
-106-
This appears to be so, but the error is small compared to the estimated 
standard deviation, to the bid-offer spread, 1 and to the level a tax-timing 
option model would be likely to predict. One would also expect the 
difference between the mean errors in the region with 8  H 10% or 14 
H 16% coupon and 0 H 12 year life, and in the region with 10 H 14% 
coupon and 0 H 12 year life to be positive. But the difference is only 
0.09, which is about half what can be accommodated by the bid-offer 
spread or two thirds of the estimated standard error. Thus, whilst there 
is some indication of a tax-timing option effect, this is not overall 
significant and appears to be comparable in size to the bid-offer spread.
1. The average bid-offer spread in that region is almost 0.1.
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5.5 Conclusions
The tax-timing option theory has some robust implications. In 
particular, the value of the option should be considerable, and such 
that it would be detected statistically if it were reflected in the market. 
The gilt market, however, appears not to recognize any significant 
value to the option, although there are signs of a small mispricing of 
gilts in the direction predicted by the option.
There are a number of reasons why investors might be reluctant to pay 
a premium for the option:
(i) many investors are reluctant to produce low profits figures, even 
though this may be tax efficient
(ii) too open tax avoidance could be disallowed by the tax authority
(iii) many investors frequently liquidate holdings independently of 
tax considerations so as to re-balance their portfolio or to engage 
in switches aimed at enhancing profits.
Nevertheless these results are somewhat surprising and one cannot 
help thinking that some degree of inefficiency might be present.
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VI. UK GILTS: TERM STRUCTURE ANALYSIS
6.1 Introduction
A discount function model provides a means of describing a bond 
market equilibrium. The interaction of supply and demand factors 
should, therefore, be visible in the shape and behaviour of model term 
structures. It is not easy to provide evidence regarding these 
interactions because their nature is often long term, and unobservable 
expectations clearly play a major role. In the case of the UK gilt model, 
the three net of tax discount functions provide more insight into the 
determinants of the equilibrium than would usually be the case in a 
non-segmented market. This chapter provides some evidence of 
supply and demand interplay, and illustrates how it may be possible 
to exploit the simultaneous existence of several term structures.
The approach to discount function models adopted in this study is based 
on an asymmetry between supply and demand. The demand is 
modelled insofar as required to ensure the existence of a discount 
function. The supply of stock is taken to be exogenous, and thus 
negative positions are not allowed. The applicability of such models 
is, therefore, constrained to certain types of market: for example, they 
would not usually be appropriate for a corporate bond market. Even 
if the government’s behaviour is exogenous to the model, it clearly is 
a major determinant of market prices. Apart from long term effects, 
one would expect the announcement of a new issue to cause localized 
"ripples" in the market. Empirical evidence regarding this special 
aspect is discussed in the next chapter.
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6.2 Net term structures
The typical shapes of the estimated net of tax term structures1 generated 
by the UK gilt model are summarized by the following two graphs.
As mentioned in section 3.8 these term structures are not well defined 
at certain maturities. This occurs because the (theoretical) price of a 
stock is a function only of coupon, and of the annuity and zero coupon 
prices at the same maturity and in the same segment. A set of bond 
prices can not therefore uniquely determine the price surface (or, 
equivalently, the term structure) at maturities longer than that of the 
bond of longest maturity, nor shorter than that of the bond of shortest 
maturity therein.2
To highlight this fact the portions of the term structure curves that do 
not encompass any actual bonds that fall within the relevant segment 
are denoted by thinner lines in the graphs. One might take the view 
that the degree of indeterminacy of the short maturity portion of the 
gross segment’s term structure is in a sense less than that of the long 
maturity portion of the net and net net segments’ term structures.
1. Each term structure is defined in the usual way as the set of zero-coupon (net) yields 
equivalent to each net discount function.
2. Given the prices of two bonds with different coupons and same maturity t, the price of 
any bond of maturity t and only the annuity price at maturity t - 1  can be calculated.
- 110-
Net term structures
average, daily data 1987
10 -
N ote: thin lines denote ill-defined portions o f  curve
25 287 13 16 221 4 10 19
 net net   net
Net term structures
average, dally data 1988
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
Note: thin lines denote ill-defined portions o f  curve
4
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28
 net net
It is apparent from these graphs how relatively complicated price (or 
yield) surfaces can be generated by combining very simple and 
plausible net term structures in a model that allows for segmentation.
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A number of interesting features emerge from the graphs. It appears 
for example that, relative to net and net net investors, gross investors 
have a preference for long maturities. Bearing in mind that most gross 
investors are pension funds, which have long term liabilities to match 
and therefore minimise risk by holding bonds of long maturities, this 
situation is consistent with a situation in which gross investors ’ appetite 
for long maturities is not fully met with supply of long gilts but also, 
partly, with gilts of intermediate maturity.
In these conditions, a reduction in the availability of long gilts should 
be expected, other things being equal, to produce a more negative slope 
in the segment’s term structure. A comparison of the two graphs shows 
that the gross segment’s term structure underwent precisely such a 
movement from 1987 to 1988. The following tables tend to confirm 
this explanation.
Table 23. Nominal gilt market break-down in 1987-881
£ billion (percent)
start 1987 end 1988 change
gross 29(25) 2 2  (18) -7 (-25)
net net 66(57) 15(63) 9(14)
net 9(8) 9(8) 0(0)
other 11 (10) 13(11) 2(20)
total 115 1 2 0 5(4)
1. Only conventional dated gilts are included in this break-down.
Table 24. Nominal gilt holdings break-down in 1987-88
£ billion (percent)
31 March 87 31 March 8 8 change
pension funds 29(21) 26(19) -3 (-11)
overseas investors 14 (11) 18(73) 3(22)
personal sector 15 (11) 13(9) -l(-9)
life assurance 32(23) 31(22) -U-3)
monetary sector 9(6) 5(3) -4 (-48)
building societies 9(6) 7(3) -l(-73)
other1 24(17) 34(25) 11(45)
total 137 139 3(2)
Sources: CSO, Bank of England, my estimates.
The first table gives a break-down of the gilt market according to the 
pattern of segmentation described in section 5.2. In interpreting this 
table it should be bom in mind that a stock belongs to a particular 
segment of the market because of the dominant investor, i.e. the 
investor who usually buys that type of stock, and not because the stock 
is held only by a given type of investor. It is immediately apparent 
that during the period in question there was a substantial fall in the 
supply of stocks to the gross segment and an equally substantial rise 
in the supply of stocks to the net net segment.
The second table is not quite comparable to the previous one because 
it relates to all gilts, rather than only conventional dated gilts, and is 
based on data as on 31 March. However the picture that emerges is
1. Includes official holdings. These consisted almost exclusively of short and medium 
maturity gilts.
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that of pension funds and, to a lesser extent, life funds being squeezed, 
with overseas investors increasing their share.1 Unfortunately, the size 
of the residual item makes it difficult to interpret the figures further.2
Another major feature that emerges from the term structure graphs is 
the relative rise in the net segment’s term structure. The relationship 
of the latter to that of the net net segment is particularly interesting, 
and emerges more clearly from the following graphs, which also 
illustrate further the point made about the gross segment.
12 
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\ 7
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5
02-Jan-87 15-Apr-87 30-Jul-87 10-Nov-87 24-Feb-88 09-Jun-88 19-Sep-88 30-Dec-88
1. Overseas investors typically hold mainly short and medium maturity gilts. See section 
3.2.1.
2. This item consists almost entirely of short and medium maturity gilts.
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The net segment’s term structure is, clearly, affected by the change in 
the rate of income tax used in the model, which was implemented at
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the time of the 1988 budget. However, even neglecting this, the yield 
spread between the net and the net net segments’ term structures is 
interesting.
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The following table may provide a clue to certain features of this 
behaviour. It is apparent that a large amount of net segment stock was 
redeemed in the first half of 1987, and was matched by new issuance 
with a few months delay, thus probably causing the phase of temporary 
dearness. It is also interesting to note that the net segment reacted to 
the stock market crash less violently than the others, as might be 
expected in the case of a less actively traded segment of the market. 
Finally, it is worth noting that the relative drift upwards of the net 
segment’s term structure during 1988 is probably due to demand forces, 
as the personal sector’s involvement in the gilt market declined without 
a corresponding decline in supply (see previous tables) . 1
Table 25. Issues and redemptions of net segment stocks
during 1987
date stock £ m issued (+)
or redeemed (-)
24-Feb-87 Ex 2.5 24-Feb-87 -900
1-May-87 Fn 6.5 1-May-87 -560
13-May-87 t Tr 8  13-Apr-92 + 1 ,0 0 0
14-Jul-87 Tr 3 14-Jul-87 -950
15-Jul-87 Tr 3 11-Jun-92 +500
22-Jul-87 t Tr 8  10-Dec-91 + 1 ,2 0 0
Note: t  = stocks were partly paid, and therefore would not have 
attracted much personal sector interest at first, i.e. until fully paid 
(approximately 5 weeks later).
1. At the time, personal sector holdings of bank and building society deposits rose sharply, 
encouraged by high interest rates.
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6.3 The covariance of gilt returns
The discount function model adopted has strong implications for the 
covariance of returns. To be more precise, if the prices are generated 
by a model of the form:
Pt=P(Yi>t) + e l
where pt is the vector of bond prices at time t, yt is the vector of model 
parameters, and et is the vector of errors, the probability distribution 
of pt is dependent on that of yt and Empirical calculations suggest 
that the error term ^  contributes only about 1 % of the annual stock 
price volatility, and can therefore probably be neglected for practical 
purposes. 1 One is therefore in effect left with a n-factor model.
Thus the following approximation should apply to the covariance 
matrix of gilt returns:
covCAlnpj)« JjCOvCAYjJJ/ 
where:
J, =  [3 1 n p (Y ,t)/d /]r=ri r
Incidentally, this fact might provide a means of estimating the 
covariance matrix of gilt returns if one were ready to assume that the
1. Furthermore, since errors are broadly independent across stocks, they tend to cancel out 
in a diversified portfolio.
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process yt is stationary. Empirical comparisons of this method with 
other methods commonly used1 suggests that this might be a sensible 
methodology, and that this topic probably deserves further research.
The remainder of this section focuses briefly on the main characteristics 
of the covariance of the term structures, in the hope that these may 
provide further insight into the behaviour of the factors behind them. 
The following graph illustrates the volatility of the term structure 
implied by the model, and shows the well-known tendency of long 
term rates to be less volatile than short term ones.
Net term structure volatility
dally data 1987-1988
2.1
N ote: thin lines denote ill-defined portions o f  curve
'S.
1.4
1.2
0.9
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28
gross — — net net   net
1. Alternative methods are:
i) historical price method: this has the disadvantage that stationarity is usually
unacceptable in the case of dated bonds
ii) historical yield method: this has a disadvantage similar to that which afflicts the
previous method, although the stationarity assumption is in this case less far-fetched
iii) duration based methods: the approach suggested above could be included in this
category, which encompasses a wide range of methodologies.
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The following two tables provide indications as to the correlation 
structure of the process.
Table 26. Correlation matrix 
daily data 1987-88
lly r  gross 1 0.93 0.92 0.93 0 .2 0 0.59
2 0 yr gross 0.93 1 0.79 0.80 0.15 0.53
4yr net net 0.92 0.79 1 0.92 0.26 0.60
lly r  net net 0.93 0.80 0.92 1 0 .2 2 0.57
4yr net 0 .2 0 0.15 0.26 0 .2 2 1 0.65
1 lyr net 0.59 0.53 0.60 0.57 0.65 1
It is apparent that the correlation between segments is considerable, 
but that it is usually much less than within segments. This suggests 
that segment specific factors play a major role in determining 
movements in the market.
Table 27. Autocorrelation m atrix (lag 1) 
daily data 1987-88
1 lyr gross 0.04 0.03 0.07 0 .0 2 0.06 0.08
2 0 yr gross -0 .1 1 -0.15 -0.06 -0 .1 -0 .0 1 -0.03
4yr net net 0 .1 1 0 .1 0 0 .1 0 0.05 0.09 0 .1 2
l ly r  net net 0.13 0.14 0 .1 1 0.06 0.07 0 .1 2
4yr net 0 .2 1 0.19 0 .2 1 0 .2 0 0.24 0.27
1 lyr net 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.06 0 .1 1 0.13
There generally appears to positive autocorrelation.1 Long maturities 
are an exception, and there is no obvious explanation for this. The
1. At 95% almost all the coefficients in this table are significant (the critical level is about
0.06).
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higher order autocorrelations decrease very rapidly and are almost all 
insignificant as from lag 2. It should be bom in mind that the daily 
price volatility of, say, a medium maturity gilt is of an order of 
magnitude of about 1 0  bid-offer spreads, and that if on average 1 0 % 
of the change on a day carried over to the next, this would still only 
explain a proportion of volatility of the same order of magnitude as 
the bid-offer spread. Therefore, while puzzling, a relatively high 
degree of autocorrelation on a daily basis is not perhaps too 
unreasonable.
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6.4 Conclusions
This chapter has attempted to provoke some thought as to how a model 
of the demand for gilts might be constructed utilizing the results from 
a segmented discount function model. Identification of the variables 
determining the various demand schedules is likely to be complex and 
require a longer run of data than has been used in this study, and has 
not therefore been attempted.
The supply component of the market is probably best taken to be 
exogenous. As described in the next chapter, shocks due to the 
announcement of individual issues cause short term ripples on the 
surface, but probably do not significantly affect the term structures. A 
major advantage of using these term structures would be precisely that 
they provide a sufficiently detailed description of the price structure 
to capture micro-economic effects, without suffering from the sort of 
erratic fluctuations that might afflict individual stocks.
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VII. UK GILTS: ANNOUNCEMENT EFFECTS
7.1 Gilt issues
Gilts are issued to the public by minimum price tender, bid price auction 
and tap. Tenders and auctions are used for the issue of new stock or 
of large "tranches" of existing stock. The Bank of England issues gilts 
"on tap" in the case of small "tranchettes" of existing stock that has 
been created and immediately placed on the Bank’s books, or of stock 
allotted to the Bank at the outcome of a tender or an auction. Since 
the remainder of this chapter deals with either tender or auction issues, 
a brief description of the two methods is given below.
Minimum price tenders were the standard method of issue for large 
amounts of stock before the introduction in 1987 of bid price auctions. 
Whilst technically quite different, both methods consist of a public 
invitation to treat. In tenders, bids are called for subject to a minimum 
tender price. 1 Stock is then allotted at the minimum accepted price. 
Any stock that is left unsold is picked up by the Bank of England at 
the minimum accepted price, and later resold on tap. The Bank may 
also intervene to buy stock at any higher price that it deems appropriate.
Bid price auctions are announced a few weeks before the bid date, and 
the final details of the issue are made public a few days in advance, 
whereupon trading starts on a "when issued" basis.2 There is no 
minimum tender price. The stock is allotted at the accepted bid price 
or at the average accepted price depending on the kind of tender
1. Except in the case of index-linked gilts.
2. I.e. for settlement and delivery on the first working day after the auction.
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submitted, rather than at the minimum accepted price. As in the case 
of a minimum price tender, the Bank of England may intervene to buy 
stock.
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7.2 Announcement of issue and exhaustion
Dealers and investors usually have reasonably accurate expectations 
as to the amount of gilts that will be issued over a period of months. 
However, they have only a vague idea of the exact characteristics and 
timing of the issues. Except in the case of the recently introduced 
auctions, there is little more to go by than the observation that the 
authorities tend to issue stock in a rising or stable market, and often 
seek to plug gaps in the spectrum of gilts available.
The announcement of an issue might, therefore, be expected to produce 
only modest "global effects", i.e. changes in the level of the market as 
a whole or in the shape of the yield surface. These effects are probably 
difficult to detect, since they are likely to be small compared to the 
noise in which they are immersed. By contrast, it is probably more 
easy to handle the "local effects", i.e. imperfections or ripples in the 
yield surface affecting stocks of similar characteristics and for which, 
therefore, the new issue represents a close substitute.
The exhaustion of an issue1 is also important, since it provides 
information about the strength of demand, and might be expected to 
have similar but opposite and presumably smaller effects compared 
to the announcement of the issue.
1. This will occur either because the issue was entirely bid for at an auction or tender, or 
because the Bank of England has entirely sold on tap die stock allotted to it
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7.3 Measuring "local" announcement effects
The method used to try and detect ripples on the yield surface is to 
examine time-series of daily mispricings against the model for a 
selection of gilts with characteristics similar to those of the newly 
issued gilt, including the existing stock in the case of a new tranche, 
spanning the period affected by the issue.
The announcement of an issue might be expected to cause a drop in 
the price of similar stocks, except in the case of an issue which was 
widely expected. However, even if an issue were expected, the exact 
characteristics of the stock can usually only be roughly guessed at 
except in the case of an auction, when much more information is 
available in advance, both relating to the characteristics of the stock 
and the timing of the issue. This observation is supported by the limited 
empirical evidence available to date. The conclusion might be that 
auctions are a more efficient way of issuing stock.
One might also suppose that when an issue consists of a tranche of 
an existing stock, the result may differ from that obtained when the 
issue consists of a new gilt. The price of the existing stock may 
sometimes rise because of an improvement in liquidity. The evidence 
available suggests that this could be the case.
It is reasonable to assume that the larger the issue, the larger the effects. 
Since the effects are generally small, and only large issues have been 
considered, it is impossible to confirm this.
Finally, one might surmise that in general the longer the interval 
between announcement and exhaustion, the smaller the effect of the 
latter, since it would then be more likely to be expected. The evidence 
provided suggests that this could be the case.
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7.4 Empirical evidence
The period covered by this empirical investigation spans the whole of 
1987-88. As previously mentioned, only major issues are considered, 
i.e. of £lbn or more, with the exception of the second and fourth gilt 
auctions which were for £900m and £750m respectively. This yields 
a total of 13 issues, of which 9 were minimum price tenders and 4 were 
bid price auctions. The more relevant mispricing data is illustrated in 
the following graphs, where the label a denotes issue announcement 
and e denotes exhaustion.
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Treasury 10% 9-Jun-94
Most gilts of similar maturity appear to have been affected on 
the day of the announcement and on the following day. In the 
cases illustrated below the total fall in mispricing was in the 
region of 10-30 pence. When the new issue was exhausted, prices 
tended to bounce back.
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Treasury 9% 13-Oct-08
There was no obvious effect on gilts of similar maturity, but the 
stock that has the closest duration, i.e. Treasury 8% 2002/06, 
shows a pattern of behaviour similar to that observed for the 
previous issue. This could be due to the fact that duration is more 
important than maturity to investors, and this shows up especially 
in the case of the longer maturities, for which life and duration 
differ most.
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Exchequer 9% 19-Nov-02
Several gilts of similar duration display the familiar pattern of 
behaviour, but the effect is not very pronounced. The following 
two examples illustrate the point.
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Treasury 8.75% l-Sep-97 (second tranche)
This issue provides a completely different situation. The day of 
the announcement was a hectic day, with the announcement both 
of the tender and of a base rate cut. In the confusion, many stocks 
moved heavily out of line with the rest of the market. A sharp 
rise in the mispricing of the existing tranche of the issue on the 
day of the announcement might also have reflected the 
expectation of a liquidity effect of the new tranche on the existing 
stock; the rise was followed by a sharp downward correction, 
but the overall effect is unclear. Other stocks of similar maturity 
showed no clear response.
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Treasury 8.5% 28-Jan-00
There were few stocks directly competing with this issue. Most 
of these show a clear response pattern on both announcement and 
exhaustion dates. The two stocks of closest maturity are provided 
as examples.
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Treasury 8% 13-Apr-92
This was the first auction issue. No response is apparent in gilts 
of similar characteristics. There were, however, no directly 
competing stocks. The gap in the spectrum of gilts has since 
been filled with the issue of £lbn of Treasury 8 % 10-Dec-91 and 
£lbn of Treasury 8 % 16-Jul-90. As mentioned previously, the 
method of issue may also have a bearing on this case.
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Treasury 8% 5-Oct-02/06 (second tranche)
There is a clear response pattern on the part of several similar 
stocks at the announcement of the issue. Much as in the case of 
Treasury 8.75% l-Sep-97, the reaction of the original tranche 
was mooted. Exhaustion, which occurred long after the 
announcement, appears to have had no effect.
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Treasury 8% 10-Dec-91
For several similar stocks there is a clear pattern of response on 
announcement of the issue. As in the previous case exhaustion, 
which was much delayed, had no apparent effect.
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Treasury 9% 13-Oct-08 (second tranche)
This was the second auction issue. As in the case of the first 
auction there is no discernible response. However, this issue was 
also smaller than the others, amounting to only £900m.
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Treasury Convertible 8% 16-Jul-90
The effect of this issue could have been spoilt by the fact that, 
since it was convertible and the option was at the money, it might 
have appealed to quite diverse investors. In the circumstance, 
the issue was treated by the market as a short gilt. As such, the 
most similar stock is probably Treasury 8% 10-Dec-91. The 
familiar pattern of response to announcement and exhaustion is 
again recognizable.
8 Tr 10-Dec-91
o
-0.1
-0.2
-0.3
0.4
-0 .5
0.6
0 .8
-0 .9
1
- 1.1
- 1.2
0 8 -D ec 15-D ec 22-Dec
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Treasury 8.75% l-Sep-97 (third tranche)
This was the last of the three experimental auction issues. As in 
the case of the previous auctions, there appears to have been no 
systematic response pattern to announcement and exhaustion on 
the part of similar stocks.
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Treasury 8.5% 3-Feb-94
There are no stocks directly competing with this issue. No clear 
pattern of response to announcement and exhaustion was 
detected.
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Treasury 8.5% 3-Feb-94 (second tranche)
This was the fourth auction issue. An albeit somewhat vague 
response pattern is apparent. This may be related to the fact that, 
differently from the previous auctions, the choice of gilt took the 
market completely by surprise.
8.5 Tr 3-Feb-94
-0.8 -
-0 .85 -
-0.95 -
-1.05
-1 .15
26-Jul 02-A ug 0 9 -Aug 16-Aug
14.5 Tr l-M ar-94
0 .9
0.88 -
0.86 -
0.84  -
0 .8 2  -
0 .7 8  -
0 .7 6  -
0 .7 2  -
0 .7  -
0.68 -
0 .6 4  -
0 .62
26-Jul 02-A ug 0 9 -Aug 16-Aug
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7.5 Final remarks
The effects of announcement and exhaustion are fairly clear in the case 
of most tender issues, and follow reasonable patterns. However, the 
size of the effects is generally small, more often than not around 10-30 
pence for the stock most affected, although occasionally as large as 50 
pence. The effects are therefore usually only about 2 or 3 times the 
bid-offer spread, suggesting that the gilt market is rather efficient. It 
also appears that effects tend to be spread over several days, which is 
a curious, albeit very small, type of imperfection.
These points are summarised by the following graph, which shows the 
average pattern of response for the most affected stock in each tender.
Average error effect pattern
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-0.09 -  
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-0.15 -  
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CONCLUSIONS
This study advocates the use of a new specification of discount function 
model which is easy to compute, well-behaved, and widely applicable.
After defining formal conditions under which discount function models are 
suitable, the study goes on to apply a basic version of the proposed 
specification in the case of two government bond markets that are reputedly 
free from segmentation and taxation effects. The results are broadly 
satisfactory. In particular, the standard error of either model is small, i.e. of 
the same order of magnitude as the bid-offer spread. The main weakness 
of this method appears to be the inability to capture liquidity effects.
The basic discount function model is then extended to cope with 
segmentation and taxation. The solution proposed is to estimate 
simultaneously discount functions for each of a set of representative 
investors, adjusting for tax payments in the case of taxation. After 
highlighting the weaknesses inherent in net of tax models, the study proceeds 
to apply the proposed model to the UK gilt market. The results are not as 
satisfactory as in the cases previously examined. In particular, the standard 
error is over 3 times the bid-offer spread. A major factor contributing to 
this is identified in the FOTRA effect.
The implicit tax rates obtained from the UK gilt model estimation appear to 
agree with those in force for the major investor types. In particular, it is 
shown how, in the run up to the income tax changes implemented with the 
1988 budget, the implicit tax rates changed in response to expectations of a 
tax cut.
Given the diversity in liquidity that exists in the gilt market between stocks 
of similar coupon and maturity, it was decided to try and identify factors
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affecting individual stock standard errors. The latter are shown to be related 
to the bid-offer spread rather than duration, suggesting that one of the main 
reasons adduced for modelling bond markets in a yield space, i.e. 
homoscedasticity in yield terms, is invalid. However, it is shown that 
allowing for heteroscedasticity does not in the case of the gilt market produce 
significantly different results.
The tax-timing option described by Constantinides and others has some 
fairly robust implications for the behaviour of the model residuals of gilts 
with high coupons and short to medium maturities. Empirical evidence, 
however, suggests that the gilt market place does not recognize anything 
like the option value that the theory would seem to predict.
The estimated gilt term structures are shown to react in a sensible way to 
changes in demand and supply. The effect of the announcement of a new 
issue on adjacent stocks is also clearly identified by the model, although it 
appears to be on average only about 2 or 3 times the size of the bid-offer 
spread.
On the basis of the evidence collected in this study, it would appear that 
more work on simultaneous estimation of segmented discount functions 
would be fruitful. In particular, this might be worth attempting in the case 
of segmentation without taxation. It would also probably be worth 
experimenting with a larger number of segments in the case of the gilt market.
Finally, identifying and estimating individual segment demand schedules, 
while complicated, could be an extremely valuable endeavour.
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APPENDIX1
A.1 Coupon effects
A.1.1 Duration effect
The fundamental identity defining a yield in case of no taxation 
or segmentation is:
q(y,b) = p(v,b).
This can be re-written as: 
b'w(y) = b'v
where w(y) is the discount function implied by the yield y, i.e. 
the vector with n-th component equal to (1  -I- y/1 0 0 )-n.
Since b = c u -I-100 e, where u denotes an appropriate vector of 
ones and noughts, and e denotes the appropriate unit vector, one 
gets:
c u'[v -  w(y)] + 1 0 0  e'[v -  w(y)] = 0 .
1. The notation used throughout this section is explained in chapter I.
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Taking c = 0 and c —> °° in this expression it is easily seen that:
|  e'[v -  w(y0)] = 0  |  e'v = e'w(y0)
|u'[v -  w(yJ] = 0 ^  [u'v = u'w(y J
where y0 and yM denote the zero-coupon and the annuity yield.
By substitution:
c u'[w(y J  -  w(y)] + 100 e'[w(y0) -  w(y)] = 0
and therefore, since each component of w(y) is monotonically 
decreasing in y:
j y > y 0<=>y~>y^>y.o>yo
ly<yo<=>y~<y<=>yoo<yo-
Totally differentiating gives:
u '[w (y j -  w(y)]dc + b'[3 w(y)%]dy = 0
and since b'[3 w(y)/0 y] < 0 , one concludes that:
|  dy/dc > 0  <=> y^ > y0 
|d y /d c< 0 <=>yoo< y 0.
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The coupon effect can be related to the annuity yield curve in a 
simple way by considering that, in obvious notation:
£  w,(y_ t+I) + wt+1(y_ l+1) =
T =  1
t
X v ,+ v 1(1 =
T =  1
t
£  w,(y_it) + w1+1(y0 ltl)
T =  1
so:
t
£  K (y_ ,I+i) -  wt(y_it)] + [w1+1(y_t+1) -  w1+1(y0 tt,)] = 0 .
T =  1
Therefore:
[yoo.t+^yoo.t^yo.t+^yoo.t+i
ly-t+^yco.t^yQ.t+^yoo.t-Hi
i.e the coupon effect is of opposite sign to that of the slope of the 
annuity yield curve.
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A. 1.2 Tax effect
In the case of a taxed investor in gilts who buys and holds to 
maturity, the fundamental identity becomes:
q(y,b) = p(v,b,a,y).
This can be re-written as: 
b' w(y) = b'v 
or equivalently:
c [u'v -  u'w(y)] + 1 0 0  [e'v -  e'w(y)] = 0  
where:
b = c u + 1 0 0  e 
u = [ ( l - a ) / ( l - y v t)]u 
e = [ ( l - y ) / ( l -y v t)] e.
Taking c = 0 and c —> °° it is seen that:
le'v = e'w(y0)
[u'v = u'w(y J
in analogy with the no-tax case.
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By substitution:
c u '[w (yj -  w(y)] + 1 0 0  e'[w(y0) -  w(y)] = 0
which is formally identical to the expression obtained in the 
no-tax case. Thus one concludes that:
J dy/dc > 0  <=> y > y0 <=> y^ > y <=> yM > y0 
jdy/dc < 0  <=> y < y0 <=> yM < y <=» y^ < y0.
The coupon effect depends on the tax rates and on the discount 
function. For example, given the gross discount factor curve z, 
i.e the vector with n-th component equal to [(1  -y )/(l -  yvt)]vt, 
differentiating the price function:
P = p(v(z,y),b,a,y)
would give:
3p/3a = [3b/3a]'v = — c u'v/(l -  yvj < 0
i.e. the gross yield would rise with the rate of income tax.
Similarly, if the par yield curve k were given, differentiating the 
price function:
p = p(v(k,a),b,a,y)
would give:
d p / d y =  [3b/dy]'v = [(p -  100)vJ/(l - y v j
i.e. above par the gross yield falls with the rate of tax on capital 
gains, while below par it rises. So, as one would expect, the
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taxation of capital gains and of income have, in a sense, opposite 
effects on the shape of the yield surface.
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A.2 Immunization and discount functions
Immunization1 and discount function theory are in general 
incompatible.2 In fact, within a discount function model, a parallel 
shift in the yield surface is possible only if the surface is flat. 
Furthermore, only if the surface is flat can all points on the surface of 
equal duration have equal yields. These two facts result from the 
following theorems. Whilst fairly intuitive, neither of these results is, 
to my knowledge, available in the literature.
1. Immunization is here used in the sense of the traditional duration-based bond portfolio 
management technique. This is, essentially, a method of optimization which assumes 
parallel shifts in the instantaneous yield surface. An important consequence of this model 
of investor behaviour is that any two bonds with the same duration should have the same 
instantaneous yield. Similar results are obtained if modified duration and n-annual yield 
are substituted for duration and instantaneous yield.
2. With no meaningful loss of generality, only the case of no taxation or segmentation is 
considered here.
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Theorem 1
The yield surface can shift in parallel if and only if it is flat.
Proof
The fact that a parallel shift is possible if the surface is flat is obvious. 
The converse is proved hereafter.
The fundamental identity defining a yield is:
q(y,b) = p(v,b).
Substituting appropriately and totally differentiating, bearing in mind 
that [3w(y)/3y] = Aw(y) where A denotes the diagonal matrix with 
term XXiX = t, and that in the case of a parallel shift dy = dy„ = dy0, one 
gets:
feu'w(y) + 1 0 0 e'w(y) = cu  w (yJ + 1 0 0  e'w(y0)
[c u'A w(y) + 100 e'A w(y) = c u'A w (y j +100 e'A w(y0).
Subtracting the second equation divided by t from the first gives: 
c u'(I -  A) [w(y) -  w (yj] = 0 
where A = A/t.
Clearly the equation is satisfied if c = 0, or y = y^, or t = 1. No other 
solution is possible since this would require:
u'(I -  A) [w(y) -  w (yj] = 0
with u'(I -  A) > 0 and either w(y) > wCy )^ or w(y) < w fy j, which is 
impossible.
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For t = 1 there never is a coupon effect. For t > 1 there cannot be 
either, since then c > 0  => y = y^, and an immediate result of the 
analysis of section A. 1.1 is that then y = y^ = y0 all c.
But, by a further application of the results of section A. 1.1, if there is 
no coupon effect at any maturity, the annuity yield curve, and hence 
the whole yield surface, must be flat. ■
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Theorem 2
All points on the yield surface of equal duration have equal yield if 
and only if the surface is flat.
Proof (outline)
The fact that all point on the surface of equal duration have equal yield 
if the surface is flat is obvious. The converse is not.
From the discussion of section A. 1.1, the yield is a monotonic function 
of coupon, and takes, by continuity, all values from y0 to yM.
Since duration is given by:
d = b'A w(y)/b' w(y)
one finds, chosing c = 0  and taking the limit for c —»<*>, that:
|do = e'A w(y0)/e' w(y0) = t 
{do,, = u'A w (yJ/u ' w (y j.
For t > 2 it is easily shown that dM < (t + l)/2 < t -  1. Therefore, by 
continuity, duration takes all values in the non-trivial interval (d^, t -  1). 
It follows that one can choose a pair of bonds for each of the maturities 
t, t -  1 > 2  so that they share the same pair of durations in the interval 
(d^, t -  1). If there were no coupon effect at one maturity, the relevant 
pair would have the same yield, and if all bonds with the same duration 
were assumed in general to have the same yield, the other pair would 
also have to have same yield, thus ensuring that there could be no
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coupon effect at that maturity either. By induction, one concludes that, 
if there were no coupon effect at a maturity t > 1 , the whole yield surface 
would have to be flat. 1
Suppose that the surface were not flat, so that for any maturity t > 1 
there were a coupon effect. The fundamental identity defining a yield 
could then be re-written as:
c = 1 0 0  e'[w(y) -  v]/u'[w(y) — v]
and substituting this into the expression for duration one would get:
_  u'[w(y) -  v]e'Aw(y) + e'[w(y) -  v]u'Aw(y) 
u'[w(y) -  v]e'w(y) + e'[w(y) -  v]u'w(y)
Applying this expression to two maturities t, t - 1  > 2, on the 
assumption that bonds of equal duration must have the same yield, 
then:
u'i[w(y) -  vfc^AwCy) + e^wfy) -  vJu^Awty) _ 
u'i[w(y) -  vJe^wCy) + c'AMy) ~ v]u> 0
_ u'2[w(y) -  v]e'2Aw(y) + er2[w(y) -  v]u'2Aw(y) 
u'2[w(y) -  v]e'2w(y) + e'2[w(y) -  v]u'2w(y)
for any yield y in the non-trivial interval corresponding to ( d ^ t -  1).
But the two sides of the equation are not identically equal, so the 
assumption that the yield surface wasn’t flat cannot be right. ■
1. The surface is assumed to be defined at annually spaced maturities. In the case of n-annual 
bonds it may be desirable to define the surface at n-annually spaced maturities. The proof 
can then be modified accordingly.
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